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INTRODUCTION 
In late August, 2019, the New York Times published an explosive 
long-form article addressing the effects of a little-known federal 
program designed to bring billions of dollars in investment to some of 
the poorest neighborhoods in America.1  The piece, titled “How a 
Trump Tax Break to Help Poor Communities Became a Windfall for 
the Rich,” laid out a harsh indictment of the Opportunity Zone (OZ) 
program, calling it a “once-in-a-generation bonanza for elite 
investors.”2 
The article’s authors, economics reporter Jesse Drucker and 
investigative reporter Eric Lipton, argued in exhaustive detail that a 
set of wealthy Americans — many of them with personal connections 
to President Trump, his family, or his administration — are exploiting 
the OZ program by taking advantage of its core tax benefits without 
expanding access to capital for underserved communities or investing 
in projects that will genuinely ameliorate poverty.3  “Instead,” the 
authors wrote, 
billions of [dollars of] untaxed investment profits are beginning to 
pour into high-end apartment buildings and hotels, storage facilities 
that employ only a handful of workers, and student housing in 
bustling college towns . . . .”4  As a consequence, the federal 
government is effectively “subsidizing luxury developments — often 
within walking distance of economically distressed communities — 
 
 1. Jesse Drucker & Eric Lipton, How a Trump Tax Break to Help Poor 
Communities Became a Windfall for the Rich, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 31, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/31/business/tax-opportunity-zones.html 
[https://perma.cc/E9DA-G4K9]. 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
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that were in the works before Mr. Trump was even elected 
president.5 
The story ignited a firestorm on Twitter — particularly from the 
OZ program’s defenders, who argued that the piece had 
cherry-picked damning evidence instead of reporting in a manner that 
was fair and even-handed.6  But perhaps the most innovative 
response was a Twitter thread written by Matt Wachter, Vice 
President of Finance & Development at the Erie Downtown 
Development Corporation (Erie DDC) in Erie, Pennsylvania, who 
offered a more local and nuanced critique of the Times article, 
tweeting that because of the OZ program: 
Instead of a 25-year redevelopment plan, @ErieDDC now 
anticipates it can revitalize a series of largely vacant or abandoned 
buildings at the heart of Erie’s downtown in as little as five years 
while, in parallel, new investment is providing a shot-in-the-arm to 
Erie’s emerging ecosystem of IT and cyber security small businesses, 
many of whom are women or minority-owned . . . . No federal policy 
in memory has galvanized as much excitement in our community.7 
The responses cited above exemplify the current debate about the 
OZ program.  Its proponents argue that it is a legitimate anti-poverty 
initiative, born from bipartisan consensus, with the potential to bring 
much-needed investment dollars to communities starved for access to 
capital and economic opportunity.8  They emphasize the duration of 
 
 5. Id. 
 6. See, e.g., Steven Glickman (@StevenGGlickman), TWITTER (Sept. 1, 2019, 
2:38 PM), https://twitter.com/StevenGGlickman/status/1168231608119439360 
[https://perma.cc/B4RR-ZFJ6] (“I’m disappointed that the @nytimes chose to cherry 
pick a handful of anecdotes about the #OpportunityZones marketplace to support 
conclusions that don’t reflect the reality of this bipartisan program that is having real 
impact around the country.”). 
 7. Matt Wachter (@MWachter26), TWITTER (Sept. 20, 2019, 2:54 PM), 
https://twitter.com/mwachter26/status/1175121035592646657 
[https://perma.cc/2K2B-V4QM]. Wachter later published his argument in a piece for 
LinkedIn Pulse. See Matt Wachter, If Only the NY Times Visited Erie, PA, 
LINKEDIN PULSE (Oct. 1, 2019), 
https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/only-ny-times-visited-erie-pa-matt-wachter?articleId
=6584802717942759424#comments-6584802717942759424&trk=public_profile_article
_view [https://perma.cc/TCN6-8TXR]. 
 8. For instance, former Obama Administration official, OZ investor, and 
evangelist Steve Glickman has cited the involvement of Austan Goolsbee and Jared 
Bernstein, both alumni of the Obama White House. See, e.g., Glickman, supra note 
6; see also John C. Fleming, Opportunity Zones Aren’t a Gimmick — They’re a 
Legitimate Investment Option, FORTUNE (Sept. 23, 2019), 
https://fortune.com/2019/09/23/opportunity-zones-investment-trump-taxes/ (“Those 
looking for socially conscious investing can rest assured that these Opportunity Zone 
investments will target development in areas of the country that need it most. Last 
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the program and cite a range of projects with social benefits which are 
already in the development pipeline.9  The program’s critics, which 
include the New York Times Editorial Board in an article published 
two months after the late August long-form piece cited earlier, argue 
the OZ program is little more than a sophisticated handout to rich 
investors.10  They contend that while the OZ program’s “stated 
purpose is to drive big money into investment deserts,” it is in reality, 
a “black comedy” allowing “a massive waste of public resources for 
the benefit of a wealthy few.”11  And caught somewhere in the middle 
are the state and local officials trying to make the program work. 
The purpose of this Note is not to insert itself into the debate about 
the ethics or legitimacy of the OZ program.  While there are good 
reasons to be skeptical of the program’s effectiveness as an 
anti-poverty mechanism — not least the set of high-profile OZ Fund 
managers, like the recently-pardoned “junk bond king” Michael 
Milken,12 who are not known for their concern for the poor — there 
are also early signs that the program is being leveraged to create 
social impact in some economically under-resourced areas.13  
 
year, the unemployment rate in Opportunity Zones was nearly 1.6 times higher than 
the average U.S. census tract. Similarly, the average poverty rate across Opportunity 
Zones exceeded 32%.”). 
 9. Ben Carson, Opportunity Zones: A New Dawn for Economic Opportunity, 
REAL CLEAR POL’Y (Apr. 26, 2019), 
https://www.realclearpolicy.com/articles/2019/04/26/opportunity_zones_a_new_dawn_
for_economic_opportunity_111177.html [https://perma.cc/H668-AM6T] (“Last week, 
I visited Birmingham, Alabama’s ‘Campus of Hope,’ where thousands of residents in 
Birmingham public housing will soon get access to valuable resources to help put 
them on the path to financial self-sufficiency. I also traveled to Little Rock, Arkansas 
to tour the development of Cumberland Towers. Each of these sites is situated in an 
Opportunity Zone, which means today’s snapshot represents the ‘before’ pictures on 
a self-development path made possible by the combined power of private-sector 
investment and this Administration’s foresight in public policy.”). 
 10. Opportunity Zones — For Billionaires, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 16, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/16/opinion/trump-tax-opportunity-zones.html 
[https://perma.cc/V75L-5MSN]. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Reis Thebault, Who Is Michael Milken, the ‘Junk Bond King’ Trump Just 
Pardoned?, WASH. POST (Feb. 18, 2020), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2020/02/18/michael-milken-pardon/ 
[https://perma.cc/466U-VNZ5]; see also Laura Davison, Mnuchin Says He Didn’t 
Know Milken Would Benefit from Tax Help, ACCT. TODAY (Oct. 30, 2019), 
https://www.accountingtoday.com/articles/mnuchin-says-he-didnt-know-milken-woul
d-benefit-from-tax-help [https://perma.cc/MM64-8L5D]. 
 13. See, e.g., Logan Hullinger, Innovation District Plan in York City Receives Big 
Boost from Opportunity Zone, YORK DISPATCH (Aug. 23, 2019), 
https://www.yorkdispatch.com/story/news/local/2019/08/23/innovation-district-plan-yo
rk-city-receives-big-boost-opportunity-zone/2083783001/ 
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Furthermore, as an empirical matter, the jury is largely still out on 
whether the program will live up to its stated purpose — which its 
creators have been quick to point out.  Measuring its effectiveness is 
especially complex since the OZ program’s tax benefits are deferred 
over an extended time horizon.14  And suggestions that the program 
should be completely repealed are politically impractical — at least 
for the foreseeable future, the OZ program is a legislative fait 
accompli. 
This Note is also not primarily focused on suggesting remedies to 
the structure of the OZ program at the federal level.  Possible federal 
fixes have been spelled out in a high degree of detail across many 
forums, from the halls of Congress to the pages of this very Journal.15 
Instead, this Note looks at the implementation of the OZ program 
closer to the ground: in the states and localities where OZ Funds are 
investing capital and governments are engineering policy responses to 
attract and then channel that investment.  This kind of analysis is 
warranted for a range of reasons — foremost among them is the fact 
that federal regulation surrounding the OZ program is distressingly 
skeletal.16  The enabling statutory language, included in the 2017 Tax 
 
[https://perma.cc/QE7K-8RDR] (“The high-tech Innovation District planned for 
York City’s Northwest Triangle is expected to be three times larger than initially 
planned, thanks to the area being a federally designated opportunity zone.”). 
 14. See Glickman, supra note 6 (“This program is designed for patient investors, 
and the real value comes after 10 years, with only a very small incentive upfront. That 
means smart money will look for places that have a long runway for growth (i.e. 
South Side of Chicago, Atlanta, and Detroit).”). 
 15. See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Senate Comm. on Fin., Wyden Introduces 
Legislation to Reform Opportunity Zone Program (Nov. 6, 2019), 
https://www.finance.senate.gov/ranking-members-news/wyden-introduces-legislation-
to-reform-opportunity-zone-program- [https://perma.cc/9F3E-7W32]. Senator 
Wyden’s bill would make four principal changes to the program: 
Require annual, public information reporting from Opportunity Funds and 
annual statements to the IRS from fund investors. Eliminate loopholes that 
could allow ‘sin list’ investments like casinos and prohibit investments in 
stadiums and luxury apartments. Terminate zones that are not low-income 
or impoverished, while allowing states to replace zones that are terminated. 
Tighten existing rules to ensure that this generous incentive goes to 
productive, new investments that are actually in zones, and not to projects 
that were already underway or investors trying to park their money tax-free. 
Id. See also Victoria Lee, Opportunity without Reach: The Problems with the 
Opportunity Zone Program and the Need for Clarification, Oversight, and 
Regulation, 47 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 117, 143 (2019). 
 16. Furthermore, many of the programs acknowledge that this kind of local 
leadership is essential to making the program work. See, e.g., John Lettieri & Steve 
Glickman, Local Leadership Is Key for Successful Opportunity Zones, THE HILL 
(Apr. 8, 2018), 
https://thehill.com/opinion/finance/382135-local-leadership-is-key-for-successful-oppo
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Cut and Jobs Act (TCJA), is only six pages long.17  And while the 
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) recently issued its final rules 
governing OZs — laying out the regulatory framework which will 
govern the mechanics of the program — those regulations are not 
intended to direct capital with any geographic specificity within 
existing OZs or to place additional federal restrictions around where 
and how capital can be invested at a granular level.18  At least at this 
early stage, the purpose of the regulations seems to be to clarify the 
mechanics of OZ tax benefits.19 
This bare-bones regulation is particularly striking given the sheer 
size and scope of the OZ program.  Early predictions are that OZs 
will drive “billions — even trillions — of dollars in long-term 
investment into historically impoverished urban and rural census 
tracts across the country”20 and will cost the federal government on 
the order of $1.6 billion in lost capital gains tax revenue from 2018–
2027.21  And since “new regulations stipulate that the program’s 
 
rtunity-zones [https://perma.cc/QBL5-GZCA] (“The fate of Opportunity Zones 
ultimately won’t be determined in Washington. Instead, Congress has placed a 
powerful tool in the hands of governors and mayors, who must ensure it is deployed 
thoughtfully to reinvigorate struggling communities and foster economic 
dynamism.”). 
 17. See infra Part I for a discussion about the creation of the OZ program. For the 
enabling legislation, see Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, H.R. 1, 115th Cong. § 13823 (2017). 
 18. See, e.g., John Sciarretti & Michael Novogradac, Opportunity Zones Final 
Regulations — A Detailed Look, NOVOGRADAC (Jan. 15, 2020), 
https://www.novoco.com/notes-from-novogradac/opportunity-zones-final-regulations-
detailed-look [https://perma.cc/SP46-JGXR]; see also Michael Novogradac, Clarity 
Provided by Second Tranche of Treasury Regulations to Incent More Investment in 
Opportunity Zones Businesses (Part I), NOVOGRADAC (Apr. 17, 2019), 
https://www.novoco.com/notes-from-novogradac/clarity-provided-second-tranche-tre
asury-regulations-incent-more-investment-opportunity-zones 
[https://perma.cc/S7HC-4MSJ] [hereinafter Novogradac, Second Tranche] (“The 
biggest takeaway is that the guidance addresses gating issues that were limiting 
OZ-incented investment in operating businesses, and provides added tax clarity to 
the start-up, operation and wind-down of a qualified opportunity funds (QOFs).”). 
 19. Novogradac, Second Tranche, supra note 18. 
 20. LOCAL INITIATIVES SUPPORT CORP., NAVIGATING THE OPPORTUNITY ZONES: 
COMMUNITY PARTNERS 4 (2019), 
https://www.lisc.org/media/filer_public/55/63/55635ee3-dffc-4d6d-8f5c-2e537ad567c8/
072219_lisc_opportunity_playbook_community_stakeholders.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/VK8C-VVNZ]. Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin predicted that 
OZs would generate more than $100 billion in investment in October 2018. Julia 
Manchester, Mnuchin Predicts $100B in Cap Investment from New Opportunity 
Zones, HILL (Sept. 28, 2018), 
https://thehill.com/hilltv/rising/408980-mnuchin-predicts-100b-in-cap-investment-from
-new-opportunity-zones [https://perma.cc/X8X4-6VMK]. 
 21. SCOTT EASTMAN & NICOLE KAEDING, TAX FOUND., OPPORTUNITY ZONES: 
WHAT WE KNOW AND WHAT WE DON’T 1 (2019), 
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benefits [will] continue through 2047,” the true revenue impact on the 
federal government could be decades long.22 
However, despite thin regulation from the federal government of 
the OZ program, a diverse range of state and local governments 
across the country did not wait for the IRS to finalize its rules and 
have instead generated policy responses designed both to attract and 
channel investment and to also place additional guardrails on the OZ 
program.23  This is not surprising — economic development is hardly 
the province of the federal government alone.  And — to paraphrase 
Justice Louis Brandeis writing almost a century ago — states have 
always served as “laboratories of democracy” within our system of 
federalism, designing policy approaches to meet a range of issues.24  
 
https://files.taxfoundation.org/20190107155914/Opportunity-Zones-What-We-Know-
and-What-We-Don%E2%80%99t-FF-630.pdf [https://perma.cc/WQ74-LAKH]. 
 22. Id. It is worth noting that the OZ program is off to a slower than expected 
start. See, e.g., Ruth Simon & Peter Grant, Opportunity Zone Funds Are off to a 
Slow Start, Lagging behind Heady Expectations, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 22, 2019), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/opportunity-zone-funds-are-off-to-a-slow-start-lagging-b
ehind-heady-expectations-11571742002 [https://perma.cc/KN9C-5KPM]. 
[O]pportunity-zone funds have so far, on average, raised less than 15% of 
their goals, according to a new analysis by Novogradac & Co., a San 
Francisco accounting firm that advises fund managers and investors on tax 
incentives. The Novogradac data includes 103 funds set up to invest in 
opportunity zones. These funds, which include many of the industry’s 
largest, have raised a combined $3 billion of the roughly $22.7 billion they 
seek. Novogradac said it is aware of 285 of these types of funds, though not 
all have shared fundraising details. 
Id. That said, “it isn’t surprising that the program is taking time to pick up steam, 
especially given that regulations aren’t yet final and these are new markets for many 
investors.” Id. As of January 2020, the most recent data from Novogradac show 292 
OZ Funds reporting more than $6.7 billion in equity raised, a significant increase 
over the prior month when 184 funds reported having raised $4.46 billion. Michael 
Novogradac, Opportunity Funds Listing Shows Strong Increase in Investment, 
NOVOGRADAC (Jan. 8, 2020), 
https://www.novoco.com/resource-centers/opportunity-zone-resource-center/opportu
nity-funds-listing [https://perma.cc/Q4DP-G6MY] [hereinafter Novogradac, 
Opportunity Funds Listing]. 
 23. See, e.g., Michael Novogradac, State, Local Governments Work to Steer 
Opportunity Zones Investment, NOVOGRADAC (Apr. 1, 2019), 
https://www.novoco.com/periodicals/articles/state-local-governments-work-steer-opp
ortunity-zones-investment [https://perma.cc/7KMN-J2SP] [hereinafter Novogradac, 
State, Local Governments]. 
 24. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 386–87 (1932); see generally 
Laboratories of Democracy Database, NEW AM., 
https://www.newamerica.org/in-depth/laboratories-of-democracy/ 
[https://perma.cc/VU72-96NV] (last visited Mar. 16, 2020). 
[M]any states and communities are fulfilling the role that Justice Brandeis 
envisioned when he called them ‘laboratories of democracy.’ Sometimes by 
direct ballot initiatives and sometimes by legislative action, states and 
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The purpose of this Note is to canvass these state and local policies to 
answer a compelling question: what can state and local governments 
do in response to a federal investment incentive program of this 
magnitude with so few guardrails? 
Part I introduces the OZ program.  It begins by tracing the history 
of the idea that became the first legislative attempt at enacting the 
OZ program into law, from its inception at a think tank called the 
Economic Innovation Group (EIG), to its inclusion in the TCJA, to 
its implementation by the IRS.  It then explains the principal 
components of the program and summarizes the major critiques 
offered by observers. 
Part II lays out one of the main challenges the OZ program faces: 
the danger of unconstrained investment.  It delineates the difference 
between place-based and person-based economic development 
programs and stacks the OZ program up against some of its 
intellectual forerunners (like the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit 
(LIHTC) and the New Markets Tax Credit (NMTC)). 
Part III analyzes the toolkit being developed and deployed by early 
adopters at the state and local level who are attempting to address the 
problem of unconstrained capital.  Specifically, it looks at OZ 
programs in Louisville, KY; Cuyahoga County, OH; and Washington, 
D.C.  It draws out the policy initiatives that are common across these 
different locations and also highlights their differences. 
Finally, Part IV evaluates the policy choices made by these early 
adopters.  It also suggests a range of other tools that state and 
(principally) local governments can use to attract capital, and then 
direct the flow of investment traffic. 
I. THE ORIGINS AND MECHANICS OF THE OPPORTUNITY ZONE 
PROGRAM 
A. Origins 
The idea that eventually became the OZ initiative was first 
proposed in a 2015 whitepaper titled “Unlocking Private Capital to 
Facilitate Economic Growth in Distressed Areas,” authored by two 
experts affiliated with the Economic Innovation Group (EIG), a 
 
localities have been moving forward, toward a more inclusive democracy, 
and testing new ideas for financing campaigns, structuring voting systems, 
setting district boundaries, and expanding participation. 
Id. 
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Washington, D.C.-based think tank.25  Notably, despite writing for 
EIG, the authors credentialed themselves in the report based on their 
affiliations with think tanks at opposite ends of the ideological 
spectrum: the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities and the 
American Enterprise Institute.26  The paper began with the premise 
that America’s recovery from the financial crisis and the Great 
Recession had been robust but geographically uneven: “[W]hile 
certain areas of the country are doing remarkably well and nearing or 
exceeding their pre-recession economic states, the recovery has been 
profoundly uneven, with large swaths of the country facing chronic 
rates of long-term unemployment and historically low levels of new 
investment.”27  As an illustration, the report offered unemployment 
statistics from around the country — comparing in one instance, the 
 
 25. JARED BERNSTEIN & KEVIN A. HASSETT, ECON. INNOVATION GRP., 
UNLOCKING PRIVATE CAPITAL TO FACILITATE ECONOMIC GROWTH IN DISTRESSED 
AREAS (2015), 
https://eig.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/Unlocking-Private-Capital-to-Facilitate-G
rowth.pdf [https://perma.cc/GL5G-ED3F]. EIG was founded jointly by Sean Parker, 
the creator of Napster and Facebook’s first president; John Lettieri, former vice 
president at the Organization for International Investment and once an aide to 
Senator Chuck Hagel; and Steven Glickman, an alumnus of the Obama White 
House. EIG describes itself as a “bipartisan public policy organization that combines 
innovative research and data-driven advocacy to address America’s most pressing 
economic challenges.” About Us, ECON. INNOVATION GRP., http://eig.org/about-us 
[https://perma.cc/QC5E-7ZB7] (last visited Mar. 4, 2020); see also Steven Bertoni, An 
Unlikely Group of Billionaires and Politicians Has Created the Most Unbelievable 
Tax Break Ever, FORBES (July 18, 2018), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbesdigitalcovers/2018/07/17/an-unlikely-group-of-billi
onaires-and-politicians-has-created-the-most-unbelievable-tax-break-ever/#54815872
1485 [https://perma.cc/GEE3-YN3M]; Andrea Chang, Entrepreneurs Launch 
Economic Innovation Group, a D.C. Think Tank, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 31, 2015), 
https://www.latimes.com/business/technology/la-fi-tn-economic-innovation-group-201
50331-story.html [https://perma.cc/8UDS-XXK4]. Tracing the history of the OZ 
concept is essential, since many of the early concepts EIG developed went on to be 
included in the TCJA in 2017. 
 26. BERNSTEIN & HASSETT, supra note 25. 
 27. Id. at 2. In this debate, one point of agreement is that communities of color 
have a significantly harder time accessing capital than white communities. See, e.g., 
ROBERT FAIRLIE, ET AL., BLACK AND WHITE: ACCESS TO CAPITAL AMONG 
MINORITY-OWNED STARTUPS 2 (2016), 
https://siepr.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/publications/17-003.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/LF3B-BSED] (“Black-owned businesses are persistently smaller 
and face more difficulty in raising external capital. Large differences in credit 
worthiness are important for explaining the difference. Even controlling for credit 
worthiness, persistent differences in perceptions of treatment by banks are also 
important.”); see also Access to Capital Is Still a Challenge for Minority Business 
Enterprises, MINORITY BUS. DEV. AGENCY (Mar. 1, 2010, 2:13 PM), 
https://www.mbda.gov/news/blog/2010/07/access-capital-still-challenge-minority-busin
ess-enterprises [https://perma.cc/WG48-KTXX]. 
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unemployment rates in Fresno and San Francisco, California (11% 
and 5%, respectively, as of December 2014, even though the cities are 
less than 200 miles apart).28 
The report painted a grim picture of the human cost of 
unemployment: “distressed and traumatized workers who face 
plummeting incomes, stalling career progressions, and cracking 
self-confidence.  In addition to these intuitive tragic effects of 
unemployment, research has also identified other negative side 
effects, the most distressing of which is an increase in mortality 
following job loss.”29  The report next considered — and largely 
dismissed — a range of federal subsidies which have been attempted 
in order to spur development in distressed communities: 
“empowerment zones (EZ), renewal communities (RC), enterprise 
communities (EC), and the New Market Tax Credit (NMTC).”30  The 
authors argued that the empirical research analyzing these programs 
had shown their results to be mixed, at best.31 
Accordingly, EIG proposed a new mechanism — a “New Model 
for Attracting Private Investment.”32  Since the private sector had 
little incentive to invest in higher-risk neighborhoods and provide an 
injection of capital, the federal government ought to give them one.33  
This policy solution would attempt to spur private investment in 
distressed neighborhoods by taking advantage of the staggering 
quantity of unrealized capital gains in the United States, which EIG 
estimated to be roughly $2.26 trillion at the time the report was 
written.34  The authors recommended a new kind of investment 
vehicle — a “structure analogous to that of a venture capital firm or 
 
 28. BERNSTEIN & HASSETT, supra note 25, at 2. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. at 5. While the report argued that the NMTC was the most successful 
program of the set it considered, it still contended that “the NMTC is not structured 
to induce the kind of larger-scale investment that can accelerate the revitalization of 
an entire community.” Id. at 10. Its criticism of all the programs it considered boiled 
down to complexity and underutilization, weak or misaligned incentives, the 
programs’ restrictive scope, interaction with other programs, and the absence of force 
multipliers. Id. at 11–15. 
 31. Id. at 6. 
 32. Id. at 16. The report made the assumption that “[f]or political and fiscal 
reasons, large-scale public sector investment is unlikely to happen anytime soon.” Id. 
Accordingly, this public sector investment would have to be “supplemented by 
private sector investment to support robust economic growth.” Id. 
 33. Id. “Private sector investors have little current incentive to invest in higher 
risk ventures in economically depressed communities, but the return on investment 
for doing so may increase if the existing friction could be deferred or eliminated.” Id. 
 34. Id. 
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mutual fund company,” which would operate in specific geographic 
areas, and deploy special tax benefits established for them, which 
“would apply so long as the investments stayed” in those areas.35 
Bernstein and Hassett argued this kind of policy would solve the 
shortcomings inherent in earlier economic development subsidies, 
like pooled assets, the elimination of first-mover problems, and lower 
risk to each individual investor.36  Their report closed by making a 
recommendation for how the program could work mechanically: 
“[U]nrealized capital gains might be rolled over into special funds 
constrained to invest in distressed communities, with the capital gains 
taxed only if the money is withdrawn from the qualified funds down 
the road.”37 
Bernstein and Hassett’s paper was the inspiration for the first 
legislative attempt at enacting the OZ program into law: the 
“Investing in Opportunity Act,” introduced jointly by Senators Cory 
Booker (D-NJ) and Tim Scott (R-SC), and Congressmen Ron Kind 
(D-WI) and Pat Tiberi (R-OH), first during the waning months of the 
Obama Administration, and then again in February of 2017 — just 
weeks after President Trump was sworn into office.38 
The bill’s bipartisan sponsors were enthusiastic, describing the 
program’s possible benefits in terms designed to appeal to 
constituencies on either side of the aisle.  Senator Booker, a 
Democrat, emphasized the bill’s potential to expand access to capital: 
[B]arriers stand between too many communities and access to the 
capital needed to generate economic growth and opportunity. In an 
era of capital moving overseas or going towards uses that don’t 
maximize opportunity for most Americans, our bipartisan legislation 
will help lower these barriers and jumpstart economic development 
and entrepreneurship.39 
 
 35. Id. at 17. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. See OLIVIA BARROW, NAT’L LOW INCOME HOUS. COAL., OPPORTUNITY 
ZONES 8–11 (2019), 
https://nlihc.org/sites/default/files/AG-2019/08-04_Opportunity-Zones.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/Q25U-KHSK]. The bill was introduced concurrently in the House 
and the Senate. See Investing in Opportunity Act, H.R. 828, 115th Cong. (2017); 
Investing in Opportunity Act, S. 293, 115th Cong. (2017). 
 39. John Avlon, Cory Booker and Tim Scott’s Bipartisan Plan to Wage a Smart 
War on Poverty, DAILY BEAST (Apr. 13, 2017), 
https://www.thedailybeast.com/cory-booker-and-tim-scotts-bipartisan-plan-to-wage-a
-smart-war-on-poverty [https://perma.cc/QMG7-JK25]. 
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Congressman Tiberi, a Republican, observed that the program 
would stimulate investment without requiring an outlay of 
government funds: “We’re not writing a check from the federal 
government.  We’re getting private-sector dollars.  It wouldn’t be up 
to some bureaucrat or congressman in Washington, D.C.  It would be 
up to the people in the community who would tailor the investment to 
what they think would actually work.”40 
The OZ concept reappeared several months later as a last-minute 
addition to the TCJA, the “biggest overhaul of the US tax code in 
more than 30 years.”41  It was added at Senator Scott’s insistence; in 
interviews he connected the program to his upbringing in poverty in 
South Carolina.42  Incidentally, at the time the TCJA was being 
debated, Kevin Hassett, the co-author of the EIG whitepaper 
proposing the OZ idea, had been appointed by President Trump to 
serve as the Chair of the White House Council of Economic Advisers.  
Hassett spoke approvingly of the addition in the weeks leading up to 
the bill’s passage by Congress.43  However, the inclusion of OZs to 
the TCJA went largely unnoticed.44  The New York Times noted that 
 
 40. Id. 
 41. Trump Tax Plan: The Key Points from the Final Bill, GUARDIAN (Dec. 19, 
2017), 
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/dec/19/trump-tax-plan-whats-in-the-final-
bill [https://perma.cc/68PX-9UA3] [hereinafter Trump Tax Plan]. 
 42. See Jim Tankersley, Tucked into the Tax Bill, a Plan to Help Distressed 
America, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 29, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/29/business/tax-bill-economic-recovery-opportunity
-zones.html [https://perma.cc/V5RC-5968] (“The zones were included in the tax law 
by Senator Tim Scott, a South Carolina Republican who was born into poverty in 
North Charleston, and based on a bill he co-sponsored in 2017 with several 
Democrats . . . . ‘I came out of one of these communities,’ [Scott said], ‘so I believe 
that there’s untapped potential in every state in the nation.’”). 
 43. Id. (“‘This is a little billion-and-a-half dollar part’ of the law, Kevin Hassett, 
the chairman of Mr. Trump’s Council of Economic Advisers, said in an interview. 
‘But if it’s successful, we’ll look back 10 years from now and say this was one of the 
most important parts of the tax bill, and one we didn’t talk nearly enough about.’”). 
The Times also took note of Mr. Hassett’s connection to EIG and the research which 
proposed OZs to begin with: 
Mr. Hassett has a longtime interest in providing tax incentives for economic 
development in distressed areas. He said he first began discussing 
opportunity zones with Mr. Parker several years ago at a meeting in Mr. 
Parker’s Greenwich Village home. Before joining the Trump 
administration, Mr. Hassett wrote several white papers to help elevate the 
idea as part of an extensive, multiyear effort by the Economic Innovation 
Group to win support. 
Id. 
 44. Media Coverage of the TCJA focused much more on tax cuts for wealthy 
individuals and corporations, as well as changes to the standard deduction and the 
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while Senator Scott reported speaking with both President Trump 
and Hassett about the idea before the bill’s passage, “in the rush to 
pass the bill over the course of a few frenzied weeks, the idea was 
never debated on the floor of the House or Senate.  It was never 
promoted by Republican leaders or the White House.”45  President 
Trump signed the TCJA into law at the end of December 2017.46 
B. Mechanics 
This Section gives an overview of how OZs work mechanically.  
While the tax law surrounding OZs is complicated, at the heart of the 
program is a basic bargain: investors agree to inject revenue from 
capital gains into certain low-income census tracts for a prescribed 
length of time in exchange for tax benefits from the IRS.47 
i. Opportunity Zone Selection 
The first step of implementing the OZ program was assigned to 
America’s governors (as well as the chief executives of possessions 
and territories), who were allotted 90 days from the enactment of the 
TCJA to choose which low-income census tracts would be designated 
as OZs.  For OZ selection purposes, the definition of “low-income 
census tract” comes from Section 45D(e) of the tax code, the 
NMTC.48  Governors were permitted to designate up to 25% of 
 
State and Local Tax Deduction (SALT). For example, two widely circulated pieces 
on the TCJA did not mention the OZ program at all. See Trump Tax Plan, supra 
note 41; see also Heather Long, The Final GOP Tax Bill Is Complete. Here’s What Is 
in It, WASH. POST (Dec. 15, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2017/12/15/the-final-gop-tax-bill-is-c
omplete-heres-what-is-in-it/ [https://perma.cc/VK8U-ALTL]. 
 45. Tankersley, supra note 42. Despite giving the OZ concept a more favorable 
treatment than it would go on to do in 2019, the New York Times did express early 
skepticism, noting that “risks remain, including whether investors will steer dollars 
toward areas that really need investment.” See id. 
 46. John Wagner, Trump Signs Sweeping Tax Bill into Law, WASH. POST (Dec. 
22, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2017/12/22/trump-signs-sweep
ing-tax-bill-into-law/ [https://perma.cc/8XDE-K4QF]. 
 47. Opportunity Zones Frequently Asked Questions, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., 
https://www.irs.gov/newsroom/opportunity-zones-frequently-asked-questions 
[https://perma.cc/AA7S-GLK8] (last visited Mar. 16, 2020) (“These zones are 
designed to spur economic development and job creation in distressed communities 
throughout the country and U.S. possessions by providing tax benefits to investors 
who invest eligible capital into these communities.”). 
 48. ECON. INNOVATION GRP., OPPORTUNITY ZONES: A NEW ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT TOOL FOR LOW-INCOME COMMUNITIES 1 (2018), 
https://eig.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/Guidance-for-Governors-FINAL.pdf 
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eligible census tracts as OZs.  Most significantly, they were also 
permitted to select a number of non-low-income census tracts as OZs 
with some restrictions, including the restriction that higher-income 
OZs must be geographically contiguous to low-income tracts and 
have roughly the same median family income (not exceeding 125% of 
a neighboring low-income tract).49  The OZ program placed a cap on 
these higher-income OZs, so governors were able to designate only 
up to 5% of their OZs in this manner.50  After finishing their selection 
process, governors submitted their designations of both low-income 
and higher-income tracts to the Treasury Secretary for certification.51  
Certification by the Department of the Treasury lasts a decade, 
irrespective of whether the underlying economics of a particular 
census tract change over time.52 
 
[https://perma.cc/X64V-ZAGN] (summarized as “[1] Tracts in which the poverty rate 
is at least 20 percent; or [2] Tracts in which the median family income does not 
exceed 80 percent of the statewide median family income if located outside of a 
metropolitan area; or [3] Tracts in which the median family income does not exceed 
80 percent of the statewide median family income or the metropolitan area median 
family income, whichever is higher”). This aspect of the OZ program was itself 
controversial from the start; the Treasury Department provided the census maps 
from the American Community Survey, dated from 2011–2015, and so was in some 
cases already six to seven years old at the time that governors were choosing OZs. 
See, e.g., Adam Looney, Will Opportunity Zones Help Distressed Residents or Be a 
Tax Cut for Gentrification?, BROOKINGS INST. (Feb. 26, 2018), 
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2018/02/26/will-opportunity-zones-help-distr
essed-residents-or-be-a-tax-cut-for-gentrification/ [https://perma.cc/GV9W-9G8W] 
(“[S]tates can designate once-poor neighborhoods that have already gentrified over 
the last several years. In Washington D.C., for instance, qualifying areas include the 
planned developments around DC United’s new stadium at Buzzard Point, where 
investors plan to invest hundreds of millions in and around the stadium, and the 
NoMa neighborhood where office buildings and pricey apartments are sprouting.”); 
see also Steven Berman & Louis Weller, Opportunity Zone Investments: The New 
Emerald City of Tax Law, 28 J. MULTISTATE TAX’N & INCENTIVES 8, 9 (2019) (“One 
of the things that one notices when reviewing the designated low income 
communities for NMTC purposes, and then the 25% of those census tracts that are 
designated for OZone purposes, is that many of those census tracts are already 
attractive locations for business investment even without the OZone designation.”). 
 49. Zachary Patton, Need Help Understanding the Opportunity Zones 
Eligibility?, ENTERPRISE (Feb. 9, 2018), 
https://www.enterprisecommunity.org/blog/understanding-opportunity-zones-eligibili
ty [https://perma.cc/S7KN-CTBT] (“We have received questions on this regarding 
whether a tract has to meet the 125 percent threshold for all contiguous Low-Income 
Communities. Our understanding of the guidance provided by the IRS on February 
8, 2018 is that it need only satisfy this requirement for at least one contiguous 
Low-Income Community.”). 
 50. Id. 
 51. ECON. INNOVATION GRP., supra note 48, at 1 (governors with fewer than 100 
low-income census tracts in their states could still designate up to 25 tracts). 
 52. Id. 
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ii. Commentary on the Opportunity Zone Selection Process 
One common criticism of OZs focuses on this stage of the rollout 
process and takes issue with the ability of governors to choose 
relatively higher-income neighborhoods for inclusion.  EIG, where 
OZs were born, wrote about this option in favorable terms, arguing 
that it provided governors with “real-world flexibility in assembling 
economically meaningful zones from individual census tracts.”53  
Other observers expressed concern that it would funnel capital to 
already-gentrifying neighborhoods.54  Another line of criticism in this 
same vein focuses on how gubernatorial selection of OZs was prone 
to rent-seeking and lobbyist influence,55 or clerical error.56 
 
 53. Id. at 2. 
 54. See, e.g., Samantha Jacoby, Potential Flaws of Opportunity Zones Loom, as 
Do Risks of Large-Scale Tax Avoidance, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES (Jan. 
11, 2019), 
https://www.cbpp.org/research/federal-tax/potential-flaws-of-opportunity-zones-loom
-as-do-risks-of-large-scale-tax [https://perma.cc/N3VR-M9VL]. 
 55. See, e.g., Jeff Ernsthausen & Justin Elliott, How a Tax Break to Help the 
Poor Went to NBA Owner Dan Gilbert, PROPUBLICA (Oct. 24, 2019), 
https://www.propublica.org/article/how-a-tax-break-to-help-the-poor-went-to-nba-ow
ner-dan-gilbert [https://perma.cc/F38A-PHYW] (Billionaire and Cavaliers owner 
Dan Gilbert “influenced the local [OZ] selection process, as well, other emails 
obtained by ProPublica show: Quicken’s top lobbyist was so enmeshed in the process, 
his name appears on an opportunity zone map made by the city economic 
development organization, recommending part of downtown be included in the tax 
break. No other non-city officials are named on the document”); see also, Justin 
Elliott, et al., A Trump Tax Break to Help the Poor Went to a Rich GOP Donor’s 
Superyacht Marina, PROPUBLICA (Nov. 14, 2019), 
https://www.propublica.org/article/superyacht-marina-west-palm-beach-opportunity-z
one-trump-tax-break-to-help-the-poor-went-to-a-rich-gop-donor 
[https://perma.cc/38ZN-TAQU] (“The state of Florida, based on an analysis of 
unemployment and poverty rates, had not originally intended to pick the census tract 
containing the superyacht marina for the program. But those plans changed in 
response to [billionaire Wayne, Jr.] Huizenga’s lobbying, according to documents 
from the Florida Department of Economic Opportunity obtained by ProPublica.”); 
Jeff Ernsthausen & Justin Elliott, A Trump Tax Cut Meant to Help Poor Areas 
Could Pay off for Kevin Plank and Goldman Sachs Thanks to Misaligned Maps, 
BALT. SUN (June 19, 2019), 
https://www.baltimoresun.com/business/real-estate/bs-bz-plank-opportunity-zone-201
90612-story.html [https://perma.cc/2NS7-HLQK] (“But the census tract became 
eligible to be picked as an opportunity zone because of misaligned maps. Tiny 
differences between the maps used to delineate opportunity zones and empowerment 
zones — a Clinton administration incentive for economically distressed communities 
— showed an overlap between them at that sliver of a parking lot, which the U.S. 
Treasury Department decided made the tract eligible. Maryland Gov. Larry Hogan 
chose the area for the program after his aides met with lobbyists for the project.”). 
 56. Robert Orr, These Opportunity Zones Shouldn’t Exist — Scandal or Innocent 
Mistake?, NISKANEN CTR. (Nov. 4, 2019), 
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Empirically, more than 42,000 census tracts around the country 
were eligible for designation as OZs; from those, governors selected 
roughly 8700, of which 230 were higher-income, contiguous tracts.57  
This represented 2.6% of all OZs chosen, well below the 5% cap 
imposed by the enabling legislation.58  An early analysis of the tracts 
selected for inclusion in the OZ program, performed by the Urban 
Institute, found that “the designated tracts have lower incomes, 
higher poverty rates, and higher unemployment rates than eligible 
nondesignated tracts.”59  At the same time, however, “[the] analysis 
shows minimal targeting of the program toward disinvested 
communities by a measure of investment flows developed by the 
researchers.”60 
iii. Tax Benefits at the Core 
The core of the OZ program is a set of two tax incentives offered to 
investors, which practitioners have christened the “Deferral Benefit” 
and the “Exclusion Benefit” in the legal literature.61  The Deferral 
Benefit allows an investor to sell an asset, realize a capital gain, invest 
that gain (the “underlying gain”) in a qualified OZ fund (OZFund), 
and defer payment of capital gains tax on the underlying gain until 
 
https://www.niskanencenter.org/these-opportunity-zones-shouldnt-exist-scandal-or-in
nocent-mistake/ [https://perma.cc/K5LV-ERTY]. 
Apart from the improperly classified LIC tract in Detroit (tract ID 
26163517200), misclassifications also appear to have occurred in Los 
Angeles, CA (06037206020) and Oklahoma City, OK (40109103200). 
Furthermore, these misclassifications were instrumental to the improper 
designation of two additional OZs through the Contiguous Tract Criteria 
(tracts 26163517000 & 06037206031 respectively). In total, five OZ tracts 
were misclassified. While two of these can retain their OZ status under a 
reclassification as contiguous tracts with legitimate LICs, the other three 
OZs are entirely improper — that is, they should not have qualified under 
the requirements stipulated by the TCJA. 
Id. 
 57. BRETT THEODOS, ET AL., URBAN INST., DID STATES MAXIMIZE THEIR 
OPPORTUNITY ZONE SELECTIONS? 2 (2018), 
https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/98445/did_states_maximize_their
_opportunity_zone_selections_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/75C6-68DK]. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Brett Theodos & Brady Meixell, Did Governors Target Opportunity Zones to 
Disinvested Communities?, URB. INST. & BROOKINGS INST., TAX POL’Y CTR. (May 
22, 2018), 
https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/taxvox/did-governors-target-opportunity-zones-disin
vested-communities [https://perma.cc/G4MT-Z4UP]. 
 60. Id. 
 61. See, e.g., Berman & Weller, supra note 48, at 9. 
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2026.62  The Deferral Benefit also provides a basis step-up: if the 
investor leaves the funds in an OZFund for a minimum of five years, 
she is granted a 10% basis-step up.  If she leaves the funds in an 
OZFund for a period of seven years, she is granted an additional 5% 
basis-step up.63  Put another way, if an investor takes full advantage of 
the Deferral Benefit, she will ultimately pay capital gains taxes on 
only 85% of the underlying gain. 
The Exclusion Benefit exempts the investor from paying any 
capital gains tax at all on the investment in the OZFund entirely (the 
“new gain”) if she holds that investment for a minimum of ten years.64  
Due to the total absolution of capital gains liability, commentators 
have observed that the Exclusion Benefit is potentially worth 
substantially more to investors over time than the Deferral Benefit.65 
iv. Opportunity Zone Funds 
OZFunds are the vehicle by which investors participate in the OZ 
program and take advantage of the Deferral and Exclusion Benefits.  
The enabling language in the TCJA requires that OZFunds invest 
directly in “qualified opportunity zone property” (OZProperty), or 
 
 62. Or the sale date — whichever is earlier. Id. 
 63. Opportunity Zones: A New Tool for Community Development, 
NOVOGRADAC 1 (2018), 
https://www.novoco.com/sites/default/files/atoms/files/novogradac_opportunity_zones
_fact_sheet_121318.pdf [https://perma.cc/T8BE-V9EU] (“A taxpayer who recognizes 
a gain from the sale of stock can invest the gain in an opportunity fund and postpone 
taxes on those gains until 2026. If the taxpayer holds the fund shares for five years, 
there is a 10 percent basis step-up. After seven years, there is another 5 percent basis 
step-up.”). For a set of examples illustrating the two benefits, see Christopher 
Karachale, Qualified Opportunity Funds: Deferral and Exclusion Possibilities for 
Investors, 46 REAL EST. TAX’N, 39, 39 (2019). 
 64. About Opportunity Zones, NOVOGRADAC, 
https://www.novoco.com/resource-centers/opportunity-zone-resource-center/about-o
pportunity-zones [https://perma.cc/V2EP-7VJU] (last visited Apr. 4, 2020) 
(“Furthermore, as an additional incentive to make long-term, patient capital 
investments, taxpayer’s holding Opportunity Fund investments for a period of at least 
10 years are exempt from any additional gains beyond that which was previously 
deferred.”). As a technical matter, the Exclusion Benefit works in this way: “[T]he 
basis of some or all of the taxpayer’s interest in the OZFund will be treated as equal 
to the fair market value of such interest on the date that the interest in the OZFund is 
sold or exchanged. Thus, no gain (‘New Gain’) will be realized on that sale or 
exchange.” Berman & Weller, supra note 48, at 10. 
 65. Berman & Weller, supra note 48, at 10 (“The second, and in our view 
potentially far more valuable, tax benefit . . . .”). 
1138 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XLVII 
indirectly in “qualified opportunity zone businesses” 
(OZBusinesses).66  The definitions of these terms are analogous: 
A qualified opportunity zone business . . . is defined as a trade or 
business in which substantially all of the tangible property owned or 
leased by the business is OZProperty, substituting the term 
‘qualified opportunity zone business’ for the term ‘qualified 
opportunity fund’ each place it appears in the definition of 
OZProperty.67 
v. Proposed Rulemaking and Commentary 
The TCJA tasked the IRS with promulgating rules governing the 
OZ program.  The agency issued several rounds of proposed rules, 
and then a set of final rules in December 2019.68  One of the most 
crucial rules is the 90% Qualifying Assets Test, which governs the 
percentage of OZFund assets required to be invested in eligible 
assets.  As written, the rule is much more lenient towards indirect 
OZFund investments, in other words, investments into 
OZBusinesses, than to the direct purchase of OZProperty: the rule 
obligates OZFunds to hold 90% of their assets in qualifying 
investments, but OZBusinesses are subject to a 70% tangible property 
test.69 
This disparity, some observers have argued, is cause for genuine 
concern since it may blunt the overall effectiveness of the initiative.  It 
invites OZFund managers to hold 90% of the fund’s assets in either 
stock or other ownership interest in OZBusinesses, which in turn hold 
only 70% of their assets in qualifying property.70  At bottom, then, an 
 
 66. See id. This is defined as either “OZStock . . . OZInterests . . . or 
OZProperty.” Id. The accounting firm Novogradac drew up a chart explaining these 
possible investment structures. See Opportunity Zones: A New Tool for Community 
Development, supra note 63, at 3. 
 67. Berman & Weller, supra note 48, at 11. 
 68. Lisa Zarlenga, et al., Final Opportunity Zone Regulations Provide Some 
Much-Needed Clarity, STEPTOE (Dec. 27, 2019), 
https://www.steptoe.com/en/news-publications/final-opportunity-zone-regulations-pr
ovide-some-much-needed-clarity.html [https://perma.cc/J42H-UX9D]. 
 69. John Schrier, et al., Qualified Opportunity Zone Funds: Structuring and 
Implementing Tax-Advantaged Fund Transactions, MAYER BROWN 12 (Apr. 22, 
2019), 
https://www.mayerbrown.com/-/media/files/perspectives-events/events/2019/04/qualifi
edopportunityzonefundspresentation.pdf [https://perma.cc/4VY3-AVUN]. 
 70. Berman & Weller, supra note 48, at 14. Practically speaking, this allows an 
OZFund to hold substantial percentages of its assets outside of OZs by using the 
intermediary of investing in OZBusinesses. See also Schrier, supra note 69, at 18 
(explaining that an OZFund with $10 million in assets could hold only $6.3 million 
inside an OZ by “investing $9 million in a partnership and having the partnership 
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OZFund seeking to take full advantage of this proposed rule can hold 
only 63% of its assets in an OZ.71 
Observers have also criticized the IRS’s penalties for failure to 
meet these benchmarks.  The law imposes a penalty on OZFunds that 
fail to meet the percentage thresholds described above.72  However, 
as codified in the rules, while noncompliant funds are charged a fee 
for each month they fail to meet the required investment thresholds, 
and the proposed penalty diminishes the value of the Deferral Benefit 
with time, these funds do not lose the ability to take the Exclusion 
Benefit after the ten-year investment period.73 
In view of the weaknesses of both the enabling legislation and the 
IRS’s final rules, the abuse potential of the OZ program is clear: not 
only has the federal government failed to put in place meaningful 
guardrails to channel capital, but also it has constructed a regulatory 
regime which allows investors to claim the core benefit of the 
 
invest $6.3 million (i.e., 70% of its assets) in qualified opportunity zone business 
property,” and then holding onto the remainder in cash and investing it in other 
investment vehicles. By contrast, if the fund buys OZProperty directly, “it would 
have to buy $9 million of qualified opportunity zone business property, all of which 
would have to constitute tangible assets”). 
 71. Berman & Weller, supra note 48, at 14. 
 72. See generally Lydia O’Neal, Opportunity Zone Rules Leave out Data 
Reporting, Penalty Details, BLOOMBERG TAX (Apr. 22, 2019), 
https://news.bloombergtax.com/daily-tax-report/opportunity-zone-rules-leave-out-dat
a-reporting-penalty-details [https://perma.cc/Z8HH-5EYJ]. 
 73. See Berman & Weller, supra note 48, at 16 (“The penalty is calculated based 
on the excess of 90% of the amount of the assets in the OZFund over the aggregate 
amount of the ‘qualified opportunity zone property’ held by the OZFund, multiplied 
by the underpayment rate established under the IRC for such month. This penalty, in 
effect, chips away at the Deferral Benefit until December 31, 2026, but does nothing 
to mitigate or take away the Exclusion Benefit. By the standards of penalty 
provisions in the IRC, this one is particularly gentle, as the currently applicable 
interest rate under Section 6621(a)(2) is about 6.0% per annum.”). A final concern 
covered in the piece is the “working capital rule” included in the proposed rules: 
With respect to the temporal aspect relating to an entity’s holding period for 
OZProperty, the issue is how the test will be applied when the entity does 
not have existing operations or assets when the OZFund invests, but intends 
to use OZFund capital to fund operations or acquire assets. The Proposed 
Regulations take much of the pressure off of this issue by providing a 
‘working capital’ rule modeled after Section 1397C(e)(1), permitting an 
OZFund that is developing a new business or constructing or rehabilitating 
real estate (or the entity representing an issuer of OZStock or OZInterests) 
to deploy its capital over a 31-month period provided that it has: (a) a 
written plan to utilize capital to create OZProperty; (b) establishes a written 
schedule of how the capital will be deployed in pursuit of this end, (c) and 
adheres to the plan and schedule. 
Id. at 14–15. 
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initiative while, at times, investing barely over half of the capital in 
their OZFunds in actual OZs by using an intermediary. 
II. THE DANGER OF UNCONSTRAINED CAPITAL AND THE TENSION 
BETWEEN PLACE-BASED AND PERSON-BASED PROGRAMS 
Essential to the debate over the efficacy of OZs is a distinction 
between economic development programs that target “distressed 
communities” and those that target “distressed people” — in other 
words, between what scholars term “place-based” programs (the 
former) and “person-based” programs (the latter).74  Both styles of 
the initiative have defenders and detractors.  In recent years, 
place-based programs have been a particular lightning rod in the 
economic development literature.  Advocates for place-based 
programs argue, variously, that “large, place-making developments 
can help revitalize low-income areas,” or that “the collection of 
neighborhoods making up an inner city are an ideal sub-region for a 
place-based approach.”75  Critics respond that place-based programs 
ignore the “corporate and political forces that create economic 
inequality and widespread poverty,” and that while “American 
workers today face declining job security and dwindling earnings as 
companies downsize, move overseas, and shift more jobs to part-time 
workers,” place-based programs “cannot address these major 
trends.”76 
 
 74. Randall Crane & Michael Manville, People or Place?: Revisiting the Who 
versus the Where of Urban Development, LINCOLN INST. LAND POL’Y 2 (July 2008), 
https://community-wealth.org/sites/clone.community-wealth.org/files/downloads/articl
e-crane-manville.pdf [https://perma.cc/S2SF-R9SG]. 
 75. CTR. ON PHILANTHROPY & PUB. POLICY, SOL PRICE CTR. FOR SOC. 
INNOVATION, PLACE-BASED INITIATIVES IN THE CONTEXT OF PUBLIC POLICY AND 
MARKETS: MOVING TO HIGHER GROUND 3 (2015), 
https://socialinnovation.usc.edu/files/2014/12/Prioritizing-Place-Moving-to-Higher-Gr
ound.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z2YT-LPQ3]. 
 76. Peter Dreier, Philanthropy’s Misguided Ideas for Fixing Ghetto Poverty: The 
Limits of Free Markets and Place-Based Initiatives, NONPROFIT Q. (Mar. 19, 2015), 
https://nonprofitquarterly.org/philanthropy-ideas-for-fixing-ghetto-poverty-the-limits
-of-free-markets-and-place-based-initiatives/ [https://perma.cc/GRM7-LDYU] 
(“American workers today face declining job security and dwindling earnings as 
companies downsize, move overseas, and shift more jobs to part-time workers . . . . 
As indicated above, place-based policies cannot on their own address the major 
trends that have led to widening inequality, a decline in the overall standard of living 
for most Americans, and an increase in poverty.”). For an analysis of why the efficacy 
of place-based programs is challenging to measure, see AUSTIN NICHOLS, URBAN 
INST., EVALUATION OF COMMUNITY-WIDE INTERVENTIONS 1 (2013), 
https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/23766/412855-Evaluation-of-Co
mmunity-Wide-Interventions.PDF [https://perma.cc/5YCA-98YR]. Professor 
Michelle Layser has been similarly pointed in her criticism of place-based programs: 
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As a place-based initiative, the OZ program finds itself squarely at 
the center of this debate.  In relevant ways, it is similar to the 
place-based initiatives that preceded it at the federal and state levels, 
including national programs like Empowerment Zones (EZs) and the 
Renewal Communities (RC) project which succeeded it,77 as well as 
the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC), the New Markets Tax 
Credit (NMTC), and state Enterprise Zones.78  Like NMTCs, for 
example, OZs require investing in a pre-selected geographical area 
for a preset length of time.  However, one crucial difference between 
the OZ initiative and its intellectual grandparents is the absence of a 
competitive process and the comparatively skeletal federal regulatory 
regime. The LIHTC and the NMTC are competitive grant programs: 
state housing finance agencies, or HFAs (for LIHTC), and the 
Department of the Treasury (for NMTC) evaluate applications and 
 
“In sum, spatially oriented investment tax incentives are the dominant form of 
place-based investment tax incentives under current law. This is true despite a lack of 
empirical evidence to suggest that such tax laws help poor communities, even though 
their proponents claim that helping poor communities is an important goal.” Michelle 
Layser, The Pro-Gentrification Origins of Place-Based Investment Tax Incentives 
and a Path toward Community Oriented Reform, 2019 WIS. L. REV. 745, 771 (2019). 
 77. Community Partners, LOC. INITIATIVES SUPPORT CORP., 
https://www.lisc.org/opportunity-zones/community-partners-playbook/introduction/ 
[https://perma.cc/5VK3-DYZQ] (last visited Apr. 4, 2020) (“Opportunity Zones are 
certainly not the first tax incentives for investments in distressed communities. The 
Empowerment Zone (EZ) program, created in 1993, enabled businesses located in 
low-income communities selected by HUD and USDA to claim certain tax benefits. 
In competitions held in 1994 and 1998, HUD selected 30 different urban EZs, and the 
USDA selected 10 rural EZs. In 2000, Congress created the Renewal Communities 
(RCs) program to replace the Empowerment Zone program, and in 2001 HUD 
selected 40 RCs, 28 in urban areas and 12 in rural areas. While HUD and the USDA 
are no longer designating new EZs and RCs, businesses operating in those 
communities can continue to claim certain tax benefits.”). 
 78. Id. (“In 2000, in the same legislation that authorized the Renewal 
Communities program, Congress enacted the New Markets Tax Credit (NMTC) 
program. Under this program, investors can claim tax credits for investing in 
Treasury-certified Community Development Entities (CDEs), which in turn provide 
loans and investments to businesses and real estate projects in low-income 
communities. The investor may claim tax credits valued at 39% of the total 
investment in the CDE, phased in over a seven-year holding period. The total tax 
credit allocation authority is currently capped at $3.5 billion annually, meaning that 
CDEs must apply to the Treasury Department for the authority to issue tax credits to 
their investors.”). Place-based incentives have been launched by states as well. See, 
e.g., Urban Enterprise Program, NJ.GOV, 
https://www.nj.gov/njbusiness/financing/uez/ [https://perma.cc/M3R9-5ULW] (last 
visited Mar. 16, 2020). There is evidence that state-based programs are effective at 
sparking job creation. See, e.g., Stephen B. Billings, Do Enterprise Zones Work?: An 
Analysis at the Borders, 37 PUB. FIN. REV. 68 (2008). 
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decide which proposals to approve.79  The LIHTC application process 
is particularly exacting, involving multiple layers of safeguards with 
restrictions imposed by both the federal government and the states.80  
State HFAs have the ability to set extended affordability 
requirements, establish that certain kinds of projects — like 
permanent supportive housing or housing for senior citizens — are 
state priorities, geographically restrict the grant of tax credits, and 
incentivize the use of companies owned by minorities or women.81  By 
contrast, OZs are far less regulated: “With the opportunity zones 
incentive, any eligible taxpayer — individuals or corporations — can 
make investments funded by realized gains in opportunity funds.  
There is no cap.”82 
Even a robust regulatory program undergirding a place-based 
incentive is no guarantee of unmitigated success.  Since their 
inception, the LIHTC and the NMTC have both attracted their fair 
share of detractors.  For instance, critics have argued that the LIHTC, 
though extremely expensive for the federal government, is ineffective 
at generating long-term affordability, or that the NMTC ends up 
benefitting residents of higher-income neighborhoods who commute 
 
 79. Opportunity Zones: A New Tool for Community Development, supra note 
63, at 1–2. 
 80. See, e.g., CORIANNE PAYTON SCALLY, ET AL., URBAN INST., THE LOW-INCOME 
HOUSING TAX CREDIT: HOW IT WORKS AND WHO IT SERVES 3 (2018), 
https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/98758/lithc_how_it_works_and_
who_it_serves_final_2.pdf [https://perma.cc/2G4Q-PPTK] (“The 9 [LIHTC] percent 
credits are allocated to states annually by the IRS to distribute to eligible projects 
through a competitive process through state housing finance agencies. Award criteria 
are updated each year through a state’s Qualified Allocation Plan, which outlines the 
state’s priorities and scoring criteria.”). 
 81. Id. at 4 (“The 9 percent credits are highly competitive, with many more 
projects requesting credits than can be funded. Because developers have strong 
incentives to score the most points possible, the preferences spelled out in a state’s 
Qualified Allocation Plan have a powerful ability to shape the type and location of 
housing built.”). To take one example, the New York State HFA established the 
development of supportive housing and senior citizen housing as goals. See 2019 
Mission Statement for the New York State Housing Finance Agency & Its Subsidiary 
the New York State Affordable Housing Corporation, N.Y. ST., HOMES & 
COMMUNITY RENEWAL (2019), 
https://hcr.ny.gov/system/files/documents/2019/04/2019-hfa-mission-statementdocx.pd
f [https://perma.cc/85HN-VBKN]. New York State also has goals to promote equity 
through its Minority and Women Owned Business Enterprise (M/WBE) program. 
See, e.g., Minority and Women-Owned Business Enterprise Compliance, N.Y. ST. 
EDUC. DEP’T., http://www.archives.nysed.gov/grants/lgrmif-mwbe-compliance 
[https://perma.cc/P5MD-YDRX] (last visited Apr. 4, 2020). 
 82. Opportunity Zones: A New Tool for Community Development, supra note 
63, at 2. 
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to targeted areas.83  There is also a concern that place-based 
initiatives, even when tightly regulated, can either cause or accelerate 
gentrification and displacement.84 
These concerns are amplified for the OZ program.  The differences 
between OZs and other place-based initiatives highlight a central 
challenge: the deployment of unconstrained capital with almost no 
federal guardrails directing it.  This is perhaps the central roadblock 
to OZs achieving their stated aim of addressing poverty.  There is, for 
instance, no requirement in the program that projects claiming OZ 
benefits create any jobs at all, let alone for poor workers.85  There is 
no obligation for OZ investors to build affordable housing that is 
accessible to longtime residents of neighborhoods designated as 
OZs.86  In fact, there are no federal safeguards at all to ensure that 
communities have any say over how and where capital is invested.87  
 
 83. Urban Institute Evaluates the Low Income Housing Tax Credit, NAT’L LOW 
INCOME HOUSING COALITION (July 23, 2018), 
https://nlihc.org/resource/urban-institute-evaluates-low-income-housing-tax-credit 
[https://perma.cc/6JVG-C4AY] (“Despite its popularity, LIHTC falls short in several 
critical areas. First, LIHTC investment does not permanently address affordability 
problems — properties are only required to be affordable for up to 30 years. The 
report cites an NLIHC estimate that more than 115,000 units could expire in the next 
five years. Additionally, LIHTC properties have struggled to meet the needs of 
extremely low-income renters (those earning below the federal poverty level or 30% 
of the area median income, whichever is greater) without additional federal rental 
assistance. The lengthy and complicated tax credit allocation process is also 
inefficient, and projects have few incentives to bring down costs.”); see also Matthew 
Freedman, Place-Based Programs and the Geographic Dispersion of Employment, 53 
REGIONAL SCI. & URB. ECON. 1, 1 (2015) (“This paper examines the labor market 
impacts of investment subsidized by the U.S. federal government’s New Markets Tax 
Credit (NMTC) program, which provides tax incentives to promote business 
investment in low-income neighborhoods . . . . I find evidence that many of the new 
jobs created in areas that receive subsidized investment do not go to residents of 
targeted neighborhoods. The results suggest that the local economic benefits of 
place-based programs may be diluted when subsidized businesses have scope to hire 
from broader regional labor markets.”). 
 84. See, e.g., Nathaniel Baum-Snow & Justin Marion, The Effects of Low Income 
Housing Tax Credit Developments on Neighborhoods, 93 J. PUB. ECON. 654, 663 
(2009) (acknowledging that isolating cause and effect here is challenging, but finding 
that “LIHTC developments significantly increase turnover of owner-occupied 
households within 1 km”). 
 85. See Daniel Hemel, A Place for Place in Federal Tax Law, 45 OHIO N.U. L. 
REV. 525, 533 (2019) (“An enterprise could, for example, acquire an existing factory 
in a high-poverty area, fire all the workers, replace them with robots, and still claim 
all the opportunity zone tax benefits for its investment.”). 
 86. Id. (“A developer could buy a building in an opportunity zone currently 
occupied by low-income tenants, tear it down, replace it with luxury rentals, and 
claim the opportunity zone tax benefits.”). 
 87. Contrast this with the fact that there is at least some political responsiveness 
baked into LIHTC. “Although they vary widely in characteristics such as their 
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Professor Michelle Layser has gone so far as to suggest that spurring 
gentrification is a feature of the OZ program, and not a bug: “[a]t the 
time when the [2017 TCJA] tax law was introduced, the Trump 
Administration’s primary focus was on creating a favorable, 
pro-growth business environment.”88  The staff of EIG who first 
helped to dream up OZs would undoubtedly disagree with that 
characterization; regardless of its veracity, however, the most 
egregious excesses of the OZ program — especially those highlighted 
in the media — tend to be clear examples of this abuse liability.89 
III. EARLY ADOPTERS: STATE AND LOCAL RESPONSES TO THE 
OPPORTUNITY ZONE INITIATIVE 
A. Overview 
In the two years since OZs were first enacted into law, researchers, 
commentators, and practitioners have written widely about how the 
program can be improved by adding guardrails to direct funding to 
areas where it is most needed and where it will be least likely to 
generate gentrification and displacement.90  One of the most 
 
relationship to state government, most HFAs are independent entities that operate 
under the direction of a board of directors appointed by each state’s governor. They 
administer a wide range of affordable housing and community development 
programs.” About HFAs, NAT’L COUNCIL ST. HOUSING AGENCIES, 
https://www.ncsha.org/about-us/about-hfas/ [https://perma.cc/7R45-MQ8H] (last 
visited Apr. 4, 2020) (emphasis added). 
 88. Layser, supra note 76, at 788. She continues:  
Given this political context, even some members of the development 
community were skeptical of the program’s objectives . . . . This critique of 
Opportunity Zones is understandable, given the law’s spatially oriented 
form. But the form itself was to be expected. Notwithstanding claims that 
the mission of Opportunity Zones is to help poor communities, the context 
and design of the new law reflect the same pro-gentrification origins that 
underlie the vast majority of place-based investment tax incentives. 
Id. at 788–89. 
 89. See generally Drucker & Lipton, supra note 1. 
 90. See, e.g., Morgan Simon, What You Need to Know about Opportunity Zones, 
FORBES (Mar. 30, 2019), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/morgansimon/2019/03/30/what-you-need-to-know-about
-opportunity-zones/#2a7627056ae2 [https://perma.cc/2KSY-T4PB] (drawing a 
distinction between “extractive” and “non-extractive” projects: “A non-extractive 
OZ project is one where the value created is shared. I’d like to see a good blend of 
broad-based ownership for employees and contractors, training and apprenticeships, 
and general acknowledgement of existing community efforts. A lot of people are 
doing these things, but they are on the margins. We need to ask . . . if a project 
generates $100M in profits, where does this money flow? How much of it is left in the 
community? I just wanted to call out that a $100M dollar investment with a little bit 
of philanthropy wrapped around it and some kind of job fair, that doesn’t really cut 
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comprehensive reports is the “Opportunity Zone Playbook” drafted 
by the Local Initiative Support Center (LISC), which proposes six 
concrete steps that community partners can take to direct streams of 
OZ funding: 
Step 1: Hold a Stakeholder Meeting/Get the lay of the land, educate 
partners about Opportunity Zone policy and engage key players . . . 
. Step 2: Embarking on a Plan for Work in the Opportunity 
Zones/Assess the terrain, map and support community planning . . . . 
Step 3: Incentives and Guardrails in the Opportunity Zones/Tapping 
policies and public programs that can help bolster success — and 
minimize risks — for communities . . . . Step 4: Collaborating to 
Build Pipeline & Leverage Local Expertise/By forging a consortium 
or grant programs, or by modeling the financial feasibility of 
projects, community partners can begin to kindle Opportunity Zone 
projects . . . . Step 5: Ramp Up Your Investor Marketing/Creating a 
prospectus, marketing your zone and other strategies for connecting 
with investors . . . . Step 6: Develop Impact Metrics & Encourage 
Transparency/Rigorous evaluation and accessible reporting are keys 
to inclusive and equitable success in the Opportunity Zones.91 
Another is the Governance Project’s “Toolkit for Maximizing the 
Impact of Opportunity Zones.”92  Across these varied approaches, 
 
it”); see also Prioritizing and Achieving Impact in Opportunity Zones, U.S. IMPACT 
INVESTING ALLIANCE 2, 
https://ozframework.org/s/Opportunity-Zones-Reporting-Framework-June-2019.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/9SCE-HZAF] (last visited May 20, 2020) (arguing that “[w]e are 
optimistic about the possibilities that Opportunity Zones and Opportunity Funds 
offer to combat economic inequality and barriers facing low-income and 
underinvested communities. We also believe that doing so will require focus on these 
goals, as well as diligent efforts to avoid unintended outcomes. These principles are 
designed to guide stakeholders, of all kinds, as they conceptualize and implement 
their Opportunity Zones activities. 1. Community Engagement: Opportunity Fund 
investors should request that fund managers integrate the needs of local communities 
into the formation and implementation of the funds, reaching low-income and 
underinvested communities with attention to diversity. 2. Equity: Opportunity Fund 
investments should seek to generate equitable community benefits, leverage other 
incentives and aim for responsible exits. 3. Transparency: Opportunity Fund investors 
should be transparent and hold themselves accountable, with processes and practices 
that remain fair and clear. 4. Measurement: Opportunity Fund investors should 
voluntarily monitor, measure and track progress against specific impact objectives, 
identifying key outcome measures and allowing for continuous improvement. 5. 
Outcomes: Opportunity Fund metrics should track real change, with an 
understanding that both quantitative and qualitative measures are valuable indicators 
of progress”). 
 91. See Community Partners, supra note 77. 
 92. Toolkit for Maximizing the Impact of Opportunity Zones, GOVERNANCE 
PROJECT 1–5 (2019), 
https://governanceproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/TGP_Toolkit.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/YD25-Q9YV] (“1. Start with a Vision or Prospectus . . . 2. Identify 
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common themes have emerged: community participation, 
transparency, scale, and impact.93  Since the goal of this Note is not to 
suggest criteria by which to measure the success of OZs, I adopt these 
four goals as normatively desirable. 
The purpose of this Part is to lay out and evaluate a broad 
spectrum of state and local government responses to the OZ 
initiative.  The following Sections analyze the work of three early 
adopters: Louisville, Kentucky; Cuyahoga County, Ohio (whose 
county seat is the city of Cleveland); and Washington, D.C. 
The selection of these three cities and their presentation order is 
intentional.  They represent a wide range of possible policy responses 
to the OZ initiative, from informal to formal policymaking power.  
They are also politically, demographically, and geographically varied: 
Louisville and Cuyahoga County have Democratic chief executives,94 
 
Zone-Specific Needs . . . 3. Identify Community Resources . . . 4. Select Priority 
Projects from the Intersection of Needs & Resources . . . 5. Develop Financing 
Models to Refine Priorities . . . 6. Progress Priority Projects into Deals.”); see also 
HOWARD WIAL, INITIATIVE FOR A COMPETITIVE INNER CITY, WHAT IT WILL TAKE 
FOR OPPORTUNITY ZONES TO CREATE REAL OPPORTUNITY IN AMERICA’S 
ECONOMICALLY DISTRESSED AREAS (2019), 
http://icic.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/ICIC_OZ_PolicyBrief.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/T3S8-XPEU] (discussing other processes and steps for maximizing 
the impact of OZ). 
 93. Commentators have also suggested applying criteria from outside the OZ 
literature to guide OZ investment. See, e.g., Nestor M. Davidson, A Better Approach 
to Urban Opportunity, 27 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. L. 449, 456 
(2019) (arguing that “Dyal-Chand argues convincingly for prioritizing the economic 
stability of workers through democratic participation, vocational training focused on 
long-term individual growth, and strong wages and benefits. She likewise argues for 
businesses to find niches that would allow for multiple bottom-line approaches, tools 
for connecting to broader markets and sources of finance, and collaborative 
structures to spread risk and leverage management expertise”). For a notable 
example of the ways in which community participation can ensure that investment 
achieves meaningful results for impacted communities, see Timothy Fields, Jr., A 
Dream Realized: Community Driven Revitalization in Spartanburg, EPA BLOG 
(Aug. 26, 2014), 
https://blog.epa.gov/2014/08/26/a-dream-realized-community-driven-revitalization-in-
spartanburg/ [https://perma.cc/8NG9-JCQX]. 
 94. See Mayor Greg Fischer, LOUISVILLEKY.GOV, 
https://louisvilleky.gov/government/mayor-greg-fischer [https://perma.cc/P627-79JY] 
(last visited Apr. 4, 2020); Office of the Executive, CUYAHOGA COUNTY, OHIO, 
http://executive.cuyahogacounty.us/ [https://perma.cc/QPL6-N7G5] (last visited Apr. 
4, 2020); see also Amina Elahi, Mayor Greg Fischer to Be Inaugurated for Third 
Term Monday, WFPL (June 6, 2019), 
https://wfpl.org/mayor-greg-fischer-to-be-inaugurated-for-third-term-monday/ 
[https://perma.cc/HZM9-PGY7]; Mark Naymik, Cuyahoga County Executive 
Armond Budish Is Lucky His Opponent Is a Nothingburger, CLEVELAND.COM (Jan. 
29, 2019), 
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while Republicans dominate the Kentucky and Ohio state 
legislatures.95  Because it is not a state and has limited home rule, 
Washington, D.C.’s political powers are constrained by the federal 
government.96 
B. Coordination Problems 
Perhaps the single greatest obstacle to using OZs for impact and 
returns (as opposed to returns alone) is a coordination problem: the 
community of investors with capital gains to deploy does not, in many 
instances, overlap with local stakeholders inside of OZs who have the 
most knowledge about which projects, if given access to capital, could 
create impact.97  Stephanie Copeland, CEO of the Governance 
Project, a leading think tank partnering with states and municipalities 
across the country to leverage OZs to create impact, phrased it this 
way: “Who knows best what communities really need?  It’s the local 
stakeholders, who are often ill-equipped to attract capital because of 
 
https://www.cleveland.com/naymik/2018/09/cuyahoga_county_executive_armo.html 
[https://perma.cc/QF9R-YKCR]. 
 95. See Kentucky General Assembly, BALLOTPEDIA, 
https://ballotpedia.org/Kentucky_General_Assembly [https://perma.cc/7U8U-QKC4] 
(last visited Mar. 16, 2020); Ohio General Assembly, BALLOTPEDIA, 
https://ballotpedia.org/Ohio_General_Assembly [https://perma.cc/WT9R-4URS] (last 
visited Mar. 16, 2020) (note that Ohio has a Republican “trifecta”: both houses of its 
legislature and its governor’s office is held by a Republican). 
 96. See DC Government Organization, OFF. CITY ADMIN., 
https://oca.dc.gov/page/dc-government-organization [https://perma.cc/5QZJ-WEZP] 
(last visited Mar. 16, 2020) (“The current form of government was established by the 
District of Columbia Home Rule Act in 1973. Although local officials have the 
authority to pass laws and govern local affairs, the United States Congress maintains 
the power to overturn local laws. Furthermore, unlike any other jurisdiction in the 
country, residents of the District of Columbia are not represented by voting members 
of the United States Congress.”); see also Martin Austermuhle, Four Decades after 
Getting Home Rule, the Fight in D.C. Goes On, WAMU 88.5 (Nov. 15, 2013), 
https://wamu.org/story/13/11/15/four_decades_on_dc_continues_fighting_for_home_r
ule/ [https://perma.cc/8MA8-26HA]. 
 97. See, e.g., Opportunity Zones Reality Check, LOC. INITIATIVES SUPPORT CORP. 
(Oct. 10, 2019), https://www.lisc.org/our-stories/story/opportunity-zones-reality-check 
[https://perma.cc/C3UD-QMXV] (“Participants noted that Opportunity Zone 
investments take time to structure and close, and require careful coordination with 
local stakeholders to ensure that community needs are met. Opportunity Zone 
funding might gravitate toward areas where development would have happened 
anyway, and one challenge would be how to direct funding to places where it would 
not have gone otherwise. Still, many investors may be looking to deploy capital by 
the end of this year in order to gain the full tax benefits of the program.” (emphasis 
added)). 
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structural disadvantages.”98  Another factor compounding this 
challenge is the reality that “capital tends to follow very hard paths” 
with “very specific ways of underwriting risk.”99  This Note concludes 
with an analysis of tools adopted across these three cities; however, as 
a threshold matter, the many practitioners I interviewed for this Note 
all agreed that solving this basic coordination problem is crucial to 
making the OZ program work on the ground. 
C. Case Studies 
i. Louisville, KY 
On a spectrum of government action directing OZ investment, 
where one end represents the exercise of informal government power 
(through networking and agenda-setting) and the other end 
represents the exercise of formal government power (through official 
actions of the chief executive or the legislature), Louisville firmly 
represents the “informal” end of the spectrum. 
Louisville Mayor Greg Fischer was an early proponent of the OZ 
initiative: many of the first law journal articles analyzing the program 
specifically mentioned him as an early adopter.100  In a late-2018 
op-ed in the Louisville Courier Journal, Mayor Fischer himself wrote 
that: 
As a former entrepreneur, I know that one of the biggest challenges 
that start-up businesses face is equitable access to capital . . . . We 
want responsible development and projects that benefit our citizens 
by providing investment without displacement . . . . If we use any 
local incentives, we will look for Opportunity Funds that would 
 
 98. Telephone Interview with Stephanie Copeland, CEO, Governance Project 
(Dec. 13, 2019). 
 99. Id. 
 100. See, e.g., Diane Lupke, Opportunity Zones: A Different Zone Opportunity, J. 
TAX’N 24, 44 (2019) (“In Louisville, Mayor Greg Fischer praised Opportunity Zones 
for attracting investment in a major business expansion . . . . One of the first 
Louisville investors to take advantage of the recently designated Opportunity Zone is 
the Marion [sic] Group through its spin-off and expansion of Blacksmith Iron Works, 
a fabrication and custom metal solutions business that recently moved into a 20,000 
square-foot facility at 3100 Vermont Avenue in the Russell neighborhood.”); see also 
Kriston Capps, The Obscure Tax Program That Promises to Undo America’s 
Geographic Inequality, CITYLAB (Apr. 25, 2018), 
https://www.citylab.com/equity/2018/04/can-opportunity-zones-save-the-country/5582
66/ [https://perma.cc/C9GK-EJY3] (“In Louisville, for example, that might mean 
turning an under-used high school into a vocational training facility. That’s one idea 
for an investment opportunity in Louisville’s historically black, near-downtown 
neighborhood of Russell.”). 
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make a social impact by hiring and partnering with local residents 
who can also benefit from any income and wealth that is created.101 
Mayor Fischer’s desire to attract capital makes sense in the context 
of economic conditions in his city: several months before his op-ed 
ran in the Louisville Courier Journal, the paper reported the results 
of a study from the Greater Louisville Project showing that one in 
five children in the city live in poverty, and that its poverty level cost 
the city $200 million each year in lost economic growth.102 
Around the same time that Louisville was looking to attract OZ 
investment, the nonprofit Accelerator for America (AFA) worked 
with local government expert Bruce Katz and his New Localism 
Advisors team to create “a replicable product — an Investment 
Prospectus — to enable cities, counties, and states to communicate 
their competitive advantages, trigger local partnerships, and identify 
sound projects that are ready for public, private, and civic capital.”103  
Louisville jumped at the chance to work with Katz and AFA: they 
enlisted Katz to work with economic development staff like Mary 
Ellen Wiederwohl, Chief of Louisville Forward (the city’s economic 
development arm) and Senior Policy Advisor Eric Burnette, and to 
draft a version of the prospectus that AFA envisioned.104 
The result was a document called the “Louisville Opportunity 
Zone Prospectus: A Platform for Action.”105  The prospectus is now 
on its second iteration: the original version was nearly 50 pages long 
and is essentially a sophisticated pitch deck aiming to connect 
investors to the city.  The document’s executive summary lays out, in 
 
 101. Greg Fischer, The City of Louisville Is Harnessing Opportunity Zones, 
COURIER J. (Nov. 7, 2018), 
https://www.courier-journal.com/story/opinion/contributors/2018/11/07/louisville-harn
essing-opportunity-zones/1863466002/ [https://perma.cc/K6QM-KM2U]. 
 102. Phillip M. Bailey, 1 in 5 Louisville Kids Lives in Poverty and a Report Says 
It’s Holding the City Back, COURIER J. (Apr. 10, 2018), 
https://www.courier-journal.com/story/news/local/2018/04/10/child-poverty-louisville-r
eport-2018/502214002/ [https://perma.cc/4SGL-JCEY]. 
 103. BRUCE KATZ & KEN GROSS, ACCELERATOR FOR AM., INVESTMENT 
PROSPECTUS GUIDE: A HOW-TO FOR OPPORTUNITY ZONES 1, 3 (2018), 
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5d9f9365f67b454b1ce2dc2f/t/5e38ae218a999b24
d895fe2e/1580772908835/New+AFA+Prospectus+Guide.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/N23K-3E5L]. 
 104. Telephone Interview with Eric Burnette, Senior Policy Advisor, Louisville 
Forward (Nov. 20, 2019). 
 105. ACCELERATOR FOR AM., LOUISVILLE OPPORTUNITY ZONE PROSPECTUS: A 
PLATFORM FOR ACTION (2018) [hereinafter LOUISVILLE OPPORTUNITY ZONE 
PROSPECTUS], 
https://louisvilleky.gov/sites/default/files/louisville_forward/louisville_prospectus_vers
ion_13_11.5.2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/F9YU-SHQ5]. 
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brief, Louisville’s argument for why investors should inject capital 
there: it is an expanding city, with a diverse and growing economy, 
whose OZs were chosen “intentionally” to “maximize the impact of 
Opportunity Zone investment.”106 
The pages that follow the summary give an overview of how the 
OZ program functions and explain Louisville’s assets in greater detail 
(with a focus on demographics and major industries).  But the heart 
of the document is a neighborhood-by-neighborhood breakdown of 
Louisville’s opportunity zones — with specific projects detailed on 
subsequent slides.  Each project slide explains the neighborhood’s 
assets, as well as tailor-made investment opportunities for investors to 
consider.  These slides also include maps (termed “mental maps” by 
AFA), which show the various OZs, as well as “land use” and other 
“assets.”107  As an example, slide 29, titled “Central Business District 
Catalytic Investment: Louisville Gardens,” describes a “[c]ity-owned, 
historic 6,000-seat performance venue,” which is “[p]rimed for 
restoration as an arts and entertainment venue, convention facility, 
and mixed-use space, at an estimated cost of $65 million,” and is 
“[l]ocated in the heart of downtown” near “10 new downtown hotels 
since 2009.”108  Immediately underneath this information, a box titled 
“The Opportunity” gives investors the hard sell: “City seeking 
development partner to create a new mixed-use facility” and “City 
offering other incentives and land.”109 
Louisville Forward released version two of the prospectus in late 
November 2019.  Like its predecessor, this new version begins with an 
overview of the city’s assets and makes a clear argument for investors 
to deploy capital there.110  However, unlike version one, version two 
of the pitch deck includes an entire category of possible projects 
called “Projects with a High Social Return” in a section called 
“Louisville Priorities.”111  The deck identifies four types of such 
projects: “[s]mall businesses and start-ups,” “[a]ffordable housing,” 
 
 106. Id. at 2. 
 107. See id. at 6. This map was later made available as a standalone product. 
Opportunity Zones — Public, ARCGIS, 
https://www.arcgis.com/home/webmap/viewer.html?webmap=0d58a1018f4d46f8a0896
cb1204960ec (last visited Mar. 22, 2020). 
 108. LOUISVILLE OPPORTUNITY ZONE PROSPECTUS, supra note 105, at 29. 
 109. Id. 
 110. See generally ACCELERATOR FOR AM., LOUISVILLE OPPORTUNITY ZONE 
DEAL BOOK (2019), 
https://louisvilleky.gov/sites/default/files/louisville_forward/louisville_oz_deal_book_
11.26.2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/V787-Z8WD]. 
 111. Id. at 12–13. 
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“[c]ommunity spaces and surrounding commercial uses,” and “[f]ocus 
on tech.”112  It also pitches specific projects already in the 
development pipeline, which are looking to attract additional 
investment — like a company called “Weather Check,” a 
black-owned business located in an OZ and part of the Y-Combinator 
incubation program in 2019.113 
In addition to drafting and releasing this pitch book, Louisville 
Forward has used the city’s informal power to attract investment in 
other ways.  It, for instance, established a relationship with OneWest, 
a nonprofit development company, which purchased a large plot of 
land in the city with plans to develop it.114  Additionally, the city 
partnered with the Louisville Urban League to help fund the 
construction of a large athletic facility called the “Track on Ali,” 
located in an OZ.115 
Finally, Louisville worked extensively with the Governance Project 
to develop a ready-made “plug-and-play” tool that will allow public 
officials to identify socially impactful OZ projects and then build out 
the kind of projections and deal documents which investors require 
when weighing the attractiveness of a potential investment.116  The 
tool, which is sponsored by the MasterCard Center for Inclusive 
Growth, is named GroundUp; Governance Project’s CEO Stephanie 
Copeland describes it as “Turbo Tax for Opportunity Zone deals”: 
“[I]t asks a set of questions about the deal, and then auto-generates 
many essential deal documents.”117  The value of this sort of tool is its 
bridging of the gap between two communities whose partnership is 
essential for using OZs for impact: investors and public officials.  
Since “a big part of community development is figuring out the 
financing structure, this tool will give public officials more of an active 
voice in conversations with the investment community, in terms that 
investors are familiar with.”118 
Louisville’s work to attract and funnel OZ investment has been 
constrained in two senses.  The first is that Kentucky, under 
now-former Governor Matt Bevin, was largely unwilling to extend 
 
 112. Id. at 13. 
 113. Id. at 17. 
 114. Id. at 19. 
 115. Id. at 20. 
 116. See Telephone Interview with Stephanie Copeland, supra note 98. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. 
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additional funding to incentivize investment.119  While some states 
have proposed layering additional tax incentives on top of the OZ 
program, Kentucky has not yet adopted that approach.120  
Additionally, as the consequence of a decision made by the Kentucky 
Retirement Systems Board, which manages the state’s public 
employee pension system, Louisville faces an increased pension 
obligation which amounts to “a looming budget hole over the next 
four years that will grow to roughly $65 million.”121  As a 
consequence, Louisville is unable to offer any additional economic 
incentives to OZ investors — which it might not have done even in an 
alternate fiscal reality in which its pension obligation had been 
lower.122 
ii. Cuyahoga County, Ohio and National Work by the Kresge 
Foundation 
One of the most demanding policy regimes developed so far to 
govern capital flows in the OZ space was created by the philanthropic 
sector and not by government.  In May 2019, the Detroit-based 
Kresge Foundation announced a $22 million investment, with 
substantial restrictions, into two OZFunds: Arctaris Impact (based in 
Boston, Massachusetts) and Community Capital Management (based 
in Ft. Lauderdale, Florida).123  These two funds were, according to the 
foundation, the first in the country to agree to “voluntary reporting, 
 
 119. See Telephone Interview with Eric Burnette, supra note 104. Although, 
concededly, it was one of the first 18 states to have its OZs certified. See Press 
Release, Team KY, Cabinet for Econ. Dev., Gov. Bevin: Kentucky Opportunity 
Zone Initiative Holds Promise of Economic Growth for Local Communities (Apr. 9, 
2018), 
http://thinkkentucky.com/newsroom/NewsPage.aspx?x=04092018_Opportunity_Zone
s.html [https://perma.cc/WV6S-LV9T]. 
 120. See 2020 State Opportunity Zones Legislation, NOVOGRADAC, 
https://www.novoco.com/resource-centers/opportunity-zones-resource-center/state-o
pportunity-zones-legislation [https://perma.cc/9NFX-97WZ] (last visited Mar. 22, 
2020). 
 121. Darcy Costello, Bevin to Louisville Mayor: How Could You Be ‘Oblivious’ to 
Pension Problem, COURIER J. (Feb. 13, 2019), 
https://www.courier-journal.com/story/news/politics/metro-government/2019/02/13/ke
ntucky-governor-bevin-calls-louisville-mayor-greg-fischer-oblivious-to-pension-probl
em/2859359002/ [https://perma.cc/9FT4-LP5U]. 
 122. See Telephone Interview with Eric Burnette, supra note 104. 
 123. Press Release, The Kresge Found., Kresge Foundation Commits $22M to 
Back Arctaris, Community Capital Management Opportunity Zone Funds (Mar. 18, 
2019) [hereinafter Kresge Foundation Press Release], 
https://kresge.org/news/kresge-foundation-commits-22m-back-arctaris-community-ca
pital-management-opportunity-zone-funds [https://perma.cc/5H2N-LFPE] . 
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metrics and transparency measures.”124  Kresge and its staff chose to 
focus on OZ investing, particularly because of a perceived gap in 
regulation from government actors: 
[W]hen public policy has a gap . . . there’s a moment for 
philanthropy to really do its job.  That’s what we have tried to do 
with Opportunity Zones, and we hope others in the philanthropic 
community will find unique ways to do the same in Opportunity 
Zones and in other places.125 
Much of Kresge’s funding comes in the form of an investment 
structure called principal protection, or “catalytic first loss capital” 
(CFLC).126  Under this relationship, the Foundation will provide a 
kind of insurance to the investors in the OZFund, a guarantee that 
Kresge will bear the first losses — up to a certain threshold — if 
investments decline in value.  The Global Impact Investing Network 
defines the concept this way: “CFLC aims to channel commercial 
capital towards the achievement of certain social and/or 
environmental outcomes . . . . [G]rants and guarantees provided 
expressly as CFLC are distinct because they always take the first loss . 
. . in the event of losses.”127 
 
 124. Id. 
 125. Joshua Pollard, Driving Social Impact: 1-On-1 with Kresge Foundation on 
Opportunity Zones, FORBES (June 7, 2019), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/joshuapollard/2019/06/07/driving-social-impact-1-on-1-w
ith-kresge-foundation-on-opportunity-zones/#2880db4e6f9a 
[https://perma.cc/ZHD6-HYXF]. 
 126. See Kresge Foundation Press Release, supra note 123. 
 127. GLOB. IMPACT INVESTING NETWORK, CATALYTIC FIRST LOSS CAPITAL: ISSUE 
BRIEF 5 (2013) [hereinafter CATALYTIC ISSUE BRIEF], 
https://thegiin.org/assets/documents/pub/CatalyticFirstLossCapital.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/K459-JN5T]. The Global Impact Investing Network has identified 
several possible benefits of catalytic first loss capital. 
(1) Impact acceleration: By offering CFLC, Providers can typically attract 
greater amounts of capital towards a targeted impact than they could 
aggregate by utilizing their own funds alone, thus multiplying the scale of 
impact many-fold. (2) Resource optimization: By incenting commercial 
investors to explore a new market, providers can potentially demonstrate 
the market’s long-term commercial viability, encouraging investors to 
continue to invest without credit enhancement. This allows Providers to 
channel their scarce resources towards issues and areas where the market 
case is not yet proven. 
(3) Better terms for Investees: By reducing the risk for Recipients, and by 
fostering greater competition in new financial markets, Providers can enable 
improved terms — such as lower cost of capital — for end Investees that are 
working on addressing important social and/or environmental problems. 
Id. at 7. 
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Principal protection/CFLC is a form of credit enhancement — in 
the same family as letters of credit from a bank used on an 
LIHTC-funded affordable housing transaction or a Small Business 
Administration loan guarantee.128  It is often provided by 
philanthropic organizations or governments as a means of attracting 
capital from investors who would otherwise perceive deals as too 
risky due to “a lack of information or track record given the novelty 
of either the market or a particular type of investment 
opportunity.”129 
For OZFunds like Arctaris, CFLC is more valuable than other 
incentives because of the funds’ focus on investment in growth or 
mid-stage investing in businesses rather than investment in real 
estate.130  State-level economic incentives like tax increment financing 
(TIF) or local incentives like accelerated zoning approval are far less 
important to OZFunds whose investments are not real 
estate-based.131  In this instance, the Kresge Foundation has agreed 
that its contribution will insure a certain percentage of these two 
funds’ investments in OZs around the country. 
In return for this commitment, the OZFunds have agreed to abide 
by a strict set of criteria — far beyond the requirements established in 
the OZ legislation — which are codified as covenants.132  The first 
metric Arctaris agreed to meet relates to scale: for every dollar of 
insurance provided by the Kresge Foundation, the fund has 
committed to raising $9 of additional capital.133  The logic underlying 
 
 128. Id. at 3. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Interview with Jonathan Tower, CEO, Arctaris (Dec. 15, 2019. This was, after 
all, the original intent of the OZ program. See, e.g., Sophie Quinton, So Far, Real 
Estate Dominates a Tax Break Meant for Businesses, PEW CHARITABLE TR. (June 
12, 2019), 
https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/blogs/stateline/2019/06/12/so-far-r
eal-estate-dominates-a-tax-break-meant-for-businesses 
[https://perma.cc/NH9U-QN4W] (pointing out that “[t]he incentive ‘will unlock new 
private investment for communities where millions of Americans face the crisis of 
closing business, lack of access to capital and declining entrepreneurship,’ said a 
bipartisan congressional group — Sens. Tim Scott, a South Carolina Republican, and 
Cory Booker, a New Jersey Democrat, and Reps. Pat Tiberi, an Ohio Republican, 
and Ron Kind, a Wisconsin Democrat — in announcing the idea”). 
 131. See Telephone Interview with Stephanie Copeland, supra note 98. 
 132. Press Release, The Kresge Found., supra note 123 (“In the absence of a 
regulatory mandate, Arctaris and CCM have committed to making investments that 
reflect the stated social and community goals of the Opportunity Zones program and 
address unmet needs in under-resourced communities.”). 
 133. Interview with Jonathan Tower, supra note 130; see also Press Release, The 
Kresge Found., supra note 123 (“Leveraging the Kresge guarantee, Arctaris plans to 
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this requirement is that the foundation wants to ensure that its 
investment would be paired with significant capital from the fund to 
reach as broad a scale as possible. 
The second is an impact requirement.  Arctaris has committed to 
making investments that are beneficial for neighborhoods: prioritizing 
affordable housing, “pathways to prosperity for residents of 
low-income communities,” and “investments in operating businesses 
that create quality jobs” — and also to forming “community advisory 
boards similar to those in the New Markets Tax Credit Program.”134 
Third, Arctaris has committed to avoid net-negative investments, 
like those that create displacement, or non-productive investments, 
like self-storage facilities.135  Finally, Arctaris has agreed to a set of 
transparency requirements, most notably, measuring and then 
disclosing the number of jobs created in each census tract by its 
investments.136 
These principles are generally aligned with the U.S. Impact 
Investing Alliance framework referenced above.  They also reflect the 
Kresge Foundation’s belief that since “the underlying legislation was 
passed without minimum transparency or reporting guidelines,” OZs 
present a “ripe opportunity for misuse.”137  Arctaris views this 
investment from Kresge as having the potential to turbocharge its 
work: to create an “exponential” impact by demonstrating to other 
foundations, municipalities, counties, and states that this kind of 
investment is worth making.  It also views the restrictions as very 
stringent: Jonathan Tower, Arctaris’s CEO, explained that these 
covenants will not disincentivize investment (otherwise the fund 
would never have agreed to them in the first place), but they do 
demarcate the outer boundary of the kind of “strings attached” that 
the fund would have accepted in exchange for CFLC.138 
 
launch a principal-protected Opportunity Zone fund with more than $500 million in 
initial capitalization from U.S. commercial banks, institutional investors, and family 
offices. Supplementing Kresge’s catalytic support, Arctaris expects to secure 
additional guarantees and grants from other foundations and state government 
economic development agencies. The Fund will make growth equity investments in 
small- to medium-sized enterprises involved in manufacturing, renewable energy, and 
telecom, as well as real estate infrastructure.”). 
 134. Interview with Jonathan Tower, supra note 130; see Press Release, The 
Kresge Found., supra note 123. 
 135. Press Release, The Kresge Found., supra note 123. 
 136. Interview with Jonathan Tower, supra note 130. 
 137. Press Release, The Kresge Found., supra note 123; see also Pollard, supra 
note 126. 
 138. Interview with Jonathan Tower, supra note 130. 
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One region which has followed the Kresge Foundation’s lead is 
Cuyahoga County, Ohio, home to the city of Cleveland.  Even before 
the Kresge Foundation named Arctaris a winner of its national OZ 
competition, the greater Cleveland area had already sought to market 
itself as an attractive destination for OZ investment and to channel 
that investment toward socially beneficial purposes, such as “jobs, 
training, education, quality affordable housing, increased access to 
broadband, public transportation and healthy-living 
environments.”139  In March 2019, the City of Cleveland and 
Cuyahoga County, in partnership with a collection of 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs), established an initiative 
called “Opportunity CLE” as the region’s main vehicle for generating 
and funneling OZ investment toward the 64 OZs across the county.140 
The initiative acknowledged in early press coverage that the OZ 
program is at risk of being abused — of becoming a “National 
Gentrification Fund.”141  In response, Opportunity CLE has taken a 
number of steps to restrict capital flows — first in the form of 
informal policymaking and networking.  For instance, Opportunity 
CLE built and released a pitch deck similar to that of Louisville and 
seeks to connect investors with entrepreneurs eager for access to 
capital.142  In partnership with the Urban Institute, the initiative is 
 
 139. Jordyn Grezelewski, ‘The Floodgates Are about to Open’: Cuyahoga County, 
Cleveland Leaders Unveil Opportunity-Zone Plan, CLEVELAND.COM (Mar. 21, 2019), 
https://www.cleveland.com/news/2019/03/the-floodgates-are-about-to-open-cuyahoga
-county-cleveland-leaders-unveil-opportunity-zone-plan.html 
[https://perma.cc/XK9X-SNKV]. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. 
The first step is marketing the region, members said. The investment 
prospectus released Thursday pitches Greater Cleveland as a place where 
investment dollars can stretch further than they would elsewhere. The 
prospectus includes sections on each of the 11 districts and provides 
information about their assets, infrastructure, population and projects under 
development there, as well as a pitch for why investors should consider 
putting their money there. The 11 districts are: Downtown Cleveland, W. 
25th-MetroHealth Corridor, Health-Tech Corridor, Opportunity Corridor, 
Glenville-Rockefeller Park Innovation District, Euclid/Collinwood 
Industrial Corridor, Outer Belt Development District, Aerozone Innovation 
Hub, Cuyahoga County Airport District, Transportation Boulevard 
Development District and Caledonia Park District. 
Id. The selection of the zones themselves was not without controversy: “East 
Cleveland, the poorest city in Ohio, received no opportunity zones. County officials 
had recommended the tract containing General Electric’s Nela Park campus, next 
door to Caledonia, but the state passed on it.” Nick Castele, Cuyahoga County Won 
Dozens of Opportunity Zones. Now What?, IDEASTREAM (Dec. 10, 2018), 
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also developing a “social impact scorecard,” not yet rolled out, whose 
purpose is to identify those projects which are “the most socially 
positive” and to help those projects attract funding.143 
Opportunity CLE received a boost in November of 2019 when the 
Ohio State Legislature passed, and Governor Mike DeWine signed, 
an additional state tax credit for OZs.144  The “Ohio OZ Tax Credit” 
provides a nonrefundable, transferable credit equal to “10% of a 
taxpayer’s qualifying investment in an Ohio qualified opportunity 
zone fund.”145  Similar to the federal OZ program, this additional 
incentive has very few restrictions: the credit tops out at $1 million 
per fiscal biennium per individual taxpayer, and the credit is capped 
at $50 million statewide per biennium.146  Additionally, there is a 
geographic requirement: capital must be invested in “an Ohio QOF 
which is a qualified opportunity fund that holds 100 percent of its 
invested assets in qualified opportunity zone property situated in an 
Ohio opportunity zone.”147  However, the restrictions end there: the 
 
https://www.ideastream.org/news/cuyahoga-county-won-dozens-of-opportunity-zones
-now-what [https://perma.cc/Y456-E4KC]. Although “out of the 320 census tracts 
nominated statewide, 213 did come from the poorest quarter of the state’s census 
tracts, two thirds of them.” Id. 
 143. Opportunity CLE Must Follow through to Promote Socially Beneficial 
Investments in 64 Local Opportunity Zones: Editorial, CLEVELAND.COM (Mar. 31, 
2019), 
https://www.cleveland.com/opinion/2019/03/opportunity-cle-must-follow-through-to-
promote-socially-beneficial-investments-in-64-local-opportunity-zones-editorial.html 
[https://perma.cc/5JR9-Z6SP]; see also Mark Opera, Opportunity Zones Were 
Designed to Spur Investment in Poor Areas. Are They Doing the Job?, 
FRESHWATER (Sept. 19, 2019), 
https://www.freshwatercleveland.com/features/oppzones091919.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/W8NY-VSF3] (noting that “[t]hough the so-called scorecard is still 
in its beta stage, [director of regional engagement at The Fund for Our Economic 
Future, Bradford] Davy is sure that if Opportunity CLE can make its usage 
necessary, it can curtail the building of projects clearly aiming to put more bucks in 
the investor’s pocket. In fact, Davy says one of the heads of the Cleveland Rocks 
Climbing Gym, Kevin Wojton, was involved in interviews to shape the tool in the first 
place”). 
 144. Jeremy Schirra & Dickinson Wright, Ohio’s 10% Investment Kicker: New 
Ohio Opportunity Zone Tax Credit Program, JDSUPRA (Nov. 5, 2019), 
https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/ohio-s-10-investment-kicker-new-ohio-91298/ 
[https://perma.cc/5YMA-LDME]. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. This should help ameliorate the loopholes created by the IRS’s 
regulations. 
The legislation clarifies whether such fund investments are considered 
invested in the zone. For example, for qualified opportunity zone property 
that is qualified opportunity zone stock or partnership interest, the stock or 
interest is in the zone if during all the qualified opportunity fund’s holding 
1158 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XLVII 
tax credit imposes no additional geographic limitations and does not 
have community involvement, impact, or transparency requirements. 
In the last year, both Cuyahoga County and the City of Cleveland 
— through the city’s Chamber of Commerce and its development arm 
— have authorized substantial expenditures to partner with 
OZFunds, with the twin goals of bringing capital to the region and 
placing restrictions on that capital’s use.  In December 2019, the 
Cuyahoga County Council148 approved $1.5 million in funding for 
Arctaris in the form of an Economic Development Loan, as part of an 
investment vehicle which will be partially guaranteed by the Kresge 
Foundation’s award.149  In return for favorable loan terms — a 
ten-year loan at 2% interest — the county has imposed a set of 
restrictions on the fund which layer on top of the Kresge 
Foundation’s.  According to the language of the resolution passed by 
the county, each proposed investment that Arctaris chooses is 
reviewable by the council “for social impact,”150 which is defined as 
“creat[ing] well-paying jobs accessible to community residents,” and 
“improve[ing] access to basic services.”151  The resolution obligates 
Arctaris to raise at least $8.5 million of investment on its own, for a 
total of $10 million in capital invested.  Arctaris is also required to 
submit a report detailing “job creation and retention reporting” each 
quarter.152  Finally, there are clear impact expectations written into 
the resolution’s language: each project that receives an injection of 
 
period for such stock or interest, the use of the corporation’s or 
partnership’s tangible personal property was in the designated zone. 
Raquel M. Mazarin, Ohio Governor Mike DeWine Signs FY 2020–21 Budget Bill, 29 
J. MULTISTATE TAX’N & INCENTIVES 27, 30 (2019). 
 148. CUYAHOGA COUNTY COUNCIL, http://council.cuyahogacounty.us/ 
[https://perma.cc/3R6F-VL6C] (last visited Apr. 4, 2020) (stating that “[t]he 
Cuyahoga County Council is the legislative body of Cuyahoga County government, 
made up of 11 elected representatives from across the County . . . . The Council 
makes policy decisions for the effective functioning of County government, and is a 
link between government agencies and citizens. It has legislative and taxing authority 
for the County, and is a co-equal branch of the County government with the 
executive branch. This form of government for Cuyahoga County was established in 
January 2011, replacing the three-member Board of County Commissioners, when 
the Charter form of government adopted by voters went into effect”). 
 149. Courtney Astolfi, Cuyahoga County Loans $1.5M to Support Manufacturing, 
Other Development in Low-Income Areas, CLEVELAND.COM (Dec. 11, 2019), 
https://www.cleveland.com/news/2019/12/cuyahoga-county-loans-15m-to-support-ma
nufacturing-other-development-in-low-income-areas.html 
[https://perma.cc/W35J-7NYG]. 
 150. Cuyahoga Cty., Ohio, Res. R2019-0255 (2019). 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. 
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capital from this new fund is expected to create “300 permanent jobs” 
within three years after its completion.153  While these expectations 
are not explained in the resolution itself, the resolution is likely 
designed to prevent the county’s investment from being used to 
finance projects which have only a short-term impact on job creation 
(generally in the form of construction jobs) and which are, as a result, 
considered socially undesirable.154 
In addition to wanting to attract capital generally, part of the 
county’s motivation for investing in Arctaris was the desire to 
revitalize its lagging manufacturing sector.155  Manufacturing was 
once the lifeblood of the region’s economy but declined precipitously 
during American deindustrialization in the second half of the 
twentieth century.156 
There are encouraging signs of a manufacturing recovery, however, 
and regional officials are hopeful that OZs can help catalyze it.  
Northeast Ohio is home to 1200 manufacturing companies — 300 of 
which are located in OZs.157  Ohio workers are employed in 
manufacturing at twice the national average and earn, on average, 
 
 153. Id. 
 154. Perhaps the clearest example is self-storage facilities, which some critics have 
characterized as “the epitome of development activity that carries . . . little economic 
benefit for residents of a distressed community.” Economics in Brief: Chris Christie 
Enters Opportunity Zone Investing, NEXT CITY (May 10, 2019), 
https://nextcity.org/daily/entry/economics-in-brief-chris-christie-enters-opportunity-z
one-investing [https://perma.cc/8YS5-XQMX]. Proposed OZ reform legislation 
introduced jointly by Senator Ron Wyden (D-OR) and House Majority Whip Jim 
Clyburn (D-SC) agrees: it would “limit investors’ ability to claim tax breaks for 
investments such as luxury apartment buildings, self-storage facilities, and sports 
stadiums, which wouldn’t likely create significant benefits for low-income residents.” 
Samantha Jacoby, Bills Aim to Curb Opportunity Zone Abuses, CTR. ON BUDGET & 
POL’Y PRIORITIES (Nov. 18, 2019, 3:00 PM), 
https://www.cbpp.org/blog/bills-aim-to-curb-opportunity-zone-abuses 
[https://perma.cc/6PNN-L6JJ]. 
 155. See Astolfi, supra note 149. 
 156. MICHAEL SHIELDS, POLICY MATTERS OHIO, MANUFACTURING A HIGH-WAGE 
OHIO 1 (2018), 
https://www.policymattersohio.org/files/research/manufacturingohio.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/3UVE-EKND] (asserting that “Ohio’s growth as a state is 
inextricable from the growth of the manufacturing industries that built its 
communities. Deindustrialization has left once-prosperous communities across the 
state poorer, weaker, and in some cases smaller. By 2016, Ohio had lost half its peak 
manufacturing jobs, and median household income trailed the nation’s by $5,300”). 
 157. Kim Palmer, Arctaris Impact Investors Aims to Bolster Financing for Area 
Manufacturers, CRAIN’S CLEVELAND BUS. (Nov. 24, 2019), 
https://www.crainscleveland.com/government/arctaris-impact-investors-aims-bolster-f
inancing-area-manufacturers [https://perma.cc/NT72-ERL7]. 
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$11,000 more than workers in other sectors.158  The manufacturing 
industry contributed $106 billion to the local economy in 2016, which 
was almost 20% of the state’s entire economic output.159  However, 
structural problems threaten to stunt manufacturing revitalization: 
manufacturing firms are generally undercapitalized because they do 
not generate enough revenue to attract investment from banks and 
are often overly reliant on loans from the Small Business 
Administration.160  Demographics compound this problem: “Over the 
next five years . . . 70% of those owners of small to midsize companies 
are looking to sell their business and are in need of buyers.”161  
OZFunds could be a natural solution to this problem.  On the 
investor side, they employ “patient capital,” which is by design a 
longer-term investment; on the investment side, manufacturing is 
similar to real estate in that it is less mobile.162  This potential is at the 
heart of Arctaris’s partnership with Cuyahoga County; in an interview 
with Cleveland.com, a principal from the firm explained that 
manufacturing would be the focus of Arctaris’s investment in the 
region.163  This kind of relationship is one of the most exciting policy 
innovations in the OZ space: Arctaris has replicated this kind of 
model across the country — local collaboration, first loss capital 
protection, and a strict set of guidelines about where and how capital 
can be invested. 
iii. Washington, D.C. 
While Louisville represents an “informal 
policymaking/networking” approach to OZ investment and Cuyahoga 
County illustrates the power of the philanthropic sector to generate 
policy innovations in the OZ space, Washington, D.C. exemplifies 
how municipal governments can use already-existing tools to control 
OZ investment using a structured economic development process.  
The microeconomic climate in the District helps explain why — D.C. 
has gentrified at a dizzying pace, particularly over the course of the 
last decade.  According to a 2019 report from the National 
 
 158. SHIELDS, supra note 156, at 1. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Palmer, supra note 157. 
 161. Id. (continuing that “[i]t is a baby boomer thing . . . . Obviously in Cleveland, 
you are dealing with a lot of third- and fourth-generation businesses, and the prospect 
that the family is going to step in to take over is unlikely” (internal quotations 
omitted)). 
 162. Id. 
 163. Astolfi, supra note 149. 
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Community Reinvestment Coalition using the most recent data 
available, 20,000 black D.C. residents were displaced between 2010 
and 2013.164  Of the major American cities analyzed in the study, 
“Washington, D.C., was the most gentrified city by percentage of 
eligible neighborhoods that experienced gentrification.”165  Investors’ 
interest has not slowed since the TCJA was enacted.  In the spring of 
2019, the commercial real estate analytics company Yardi Matrix 
named the District the most attractive region for OZ investment on 
the East Coast.166 
As a result of this context, and the sheer scale of development, 
local officials were less concerned about attracting investment dollars 
and more concerned about unintentionally accelerating the pace of 
displacement: “there was more of a sense in D.C. that the city could 
steer the ship and be more selective in terms of what zones it 
designated and tailoring those investments through public resources 
including land or subsidies.”167 
This started with OZ selection: the process of choosing the 
District’s OZs, to begin with, was run through the Office of the 
Deputy Mayor for Planning and Economic Development (DMPED), 
 
 164. JASON RICHARDSON ET AL., NAT’L CMTY. REINVESTMENT COAL., SHIFTING 
NEIGHBORHOODS: GENTRIFICATION AND CULTURAL DISPLACEMENT IN AMERICAN 
CITIES (2019), https://ncrc.org/gentrification/ [https://perma.cc/DPH5-MNUC]; see 
also Michael Quander, Cost of Living Contributes to ‘Intense’ Level of Displacement 
in DC, WUSA9 (Nov. 11, 2019), 
https://www.wusa9.com/article/features/producers-picks/gentrification-and-displacem
ent-high-in-dc/65-4543c266-350b-456e-91ab-743b6a108c4d 
[https://perma.cc/LH7A-7BEF]. 
 165. Quander, supra note 164. 
 166. Erika Morphy, DC Is the Most Attractive Opportunity Zone on the East 
Coast, GLOBEST.COM (Mar. 25, 2019), 
https://www.globest.com/2019/03/25/dc-is-the-most-attractive-opportunity-zone-on-th
e-east-coast/?slreturn=20200003153652 [https://perma.cc/F44T-KPED] (explaining 
that “[i]t used such indicators as GDP and population growth, number of eligible 
OZs, and poverty rates in each area, attributing points for each of these and 
calculating the total. The data for the indicators came from The US Census Bureau, 
the Bureau of Labor Statistics and the US Department of Treasury”). Perhaps not so 
surprisingly, the methodology underlying this ranking system completely ignored 
social impact. In actuality, it penalized OZs for having higher poverty rates: “[f]or the 
poverty rate indicator, between 0 and 15 points were awarded in inverse proportion, 
with a lower poverty rate leading to more points.” Diana Sabau, Study: Top Counties 
for Opportunity Zone Investment, COMMERCIALCAFE (Mar. 18, 2019), 
https://www.commercialcafe.com/blog/top-counties-opportunity-zone-investment/ 
[https://perma.cc/3X9B-A2KT]. 
 167. Oscar Perry Abello, Now’s the Opportunity for Cities to Work on Their Zone 
Defense, NEXT CITY (July 25, 2019), 
https://nextcity.org/daily/entry/nows-the-opportunity-for-cities-to-work-on-their-zone
-defense [https://perma.cc/92YR-YFTL]. 
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which continues to house the District’s OZ work.  Since D.C. is not a 
state, the TCJA gave Mayor Muriel Bowser the ability to submit OZs 
to the IRS in the same way as governors; DMPED was highly 
intentional about selecting zones with “demonstrated need” that had 
“investment opportunities that could be paired with complementary 
incentives to benefit residents.”168  Ultimately, the IRS certified 25 
zones total across the District, with the majority concentrated east of 
the Anacostia River in historically poorer Wards 7 and 8.169 
The District also received a major boost from the philanthropic 
sector: in September 2019, the Rockefeller Foundation announced 
that D.C. had been chosen to participate in its “Opportunity Zone 
Community Capacity Building Initiative,” which meant the 
Foundation would fund technical assistance through LISC to “build a 
pipeline of projects and small business investments that move beyond 
the early stages of planning and attract private investment in 
economically-distressed areas.”170  Mayor Bowser designated Sharon 
Carney, who was already working at DMPED, to coordinate 
Opportunity Zone efforts.  Mayor Bowser’s stated aim for 
implementing the OZ program locally is to maximize benefits to 
current residents; Carney explained that the District has approached 
this in several ways: one, by providing support and resources for 
community-based stakeholders (including projects and businesses) to 
learn about OZ and connect with potential investment opportunities; 
and two, by helping investors align with community priorities and 
 
 168. Solomon Greene, et al., Opportunity Zoning: An Inside Look at How Three 
Cities Are Aligning a Tax Incentive with Land-Use Plans to Revitalize 
Neighborhoods, URB. INST. (July 25, 2019), 
https://www.urban.org/features/opportunity-zoning [https://perma.cc/FU28-JJVD]. 
 169. Designated Opportunity Zones in DC, OFF. DEPUTY MAYOR FOR PLAN. & 
ECON. DEV. (2018), 
https://dmped.dc.gov/sites/default/files/dc/sites/dmped/publication/attachments/OZ_
Map%2BTable_for_Print_logo_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/L9MP-7QP8]; see also Martin 
Austermuhle, Investors and Developers Can Benefit from Opportunity Zones in 
D.C., but Will Residents?, WAMU (Sept. 18, 2019), 
https://wamu.org/story/19/09/18/investors-and-developers-can-benefit-from-opportuni
ty-zones-in-d-c-but-will-residents/ [https://perma.cc/A364-WK3L]. 
 170. Press Release, The Rockefeller Found., The Rockefeller Foundation Awards 
Grants to Fuel Plans for Equitable Investment in Opportunity Zones in Washington, 
DC, Oakland, Dallas, and St. Louis (Sept. 6, 2019), 
https://www.rockefellerfoundation.org/about-us/news-media/rockefeller-foundation-a
wards-washington-dc-oakland-dallas-st-louis-grants-fuel-plans-equitable-investment-
opportunity-zones/ [https://perma.cc/6ACV-TX6J]. This also includes two 
AmeriCorps VISTA staff, who will serve as community engagement specialists. Id. 
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discover resources that can help generate benefits for communities.171  
In addition, the District works to align OZ investment with the 
structures that the city already has in place for managing 
development.172 
The first of these structures pre-dates the OZ program by four 
decades: D.C.’s Advisory Neighborhood Commission (ANC) system 
enacted in 1976.  The ANC system is a feature of D.C.’s Home Rule 
Charter: locally elected commissioners serve two-year terms as the 
“official voice in advising District government . . . on things that affect 
their neighborhoods.”173  While not obligated to follow the 
recommendations of ANCs, agencies are required by law to assign 
them “great weight” and are statutorily barred from taking “any 
action that will significantly affect a neighborhood” without “giving 
the affected ANCs 30 days advance notice.”174  In effect, the ANC 
system can act as a check against socially undesirable or net-negative 
OZ investment and, at minimum, provides local stakeholders — who 
are the closest to the ground — a voice in the development process. 
The second is zoning-related.  In late 2019, the D.C. government 
completed an update of the city’s Comprehensive Plan, since, “in its 
current form, which was approved in 2006, the Comp Plan does not 
sufficiently address the District’s long-term needs around housing, 
equity, resilience, and public resources.”175  Carney noted the 
importance of such structures – including District plans and 
formalized community input mechanisms – in guiding OZ 
investments.176  In recent years, the District has been amending its 
Comprehensive Plan in consultation with tens of thousands of District 
residents through community engagement.177  The District’s 
Comprehensive Plan serves as the guide for long-term development 
and land use in the District and, as such, influences zoning and all 
 
 171. Interview with Sharon Carney, Chief Opportunity Zone Officer, Office of the 
D.C. Deputy Mayor for Planning and Econ. Dev. (Nov. 14, 2019). 
 172. Id. 
 173. Advisory Neighborhood Commissions: About ANCs, DC.GOV, 
https://anc.dc.gov/page/about-ancs (last visited Mar. 17, 2020). 
 174. Id. (“[D]etailing that [t]his includes zoning, streets, recreation, education, 
social services, sanitation, planning, safety, budget, and health services.”). 
 175. Press Release, Office of the Mayor of Wash., D.C., Bowser Administration 
Extends Public Review Period for Comprehensive Plan (Dec. 16, 2019), 
https://plandc.dc.gov/sites/default/files/dc/sites/Comprehensiveplan/page_content/atta
chments/PRESS%20RELEASE%20Comp%20Plan%20Extension_Dec2019_0.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/2DUM-HUM9]. 
 176.  Interview with Sharon Carney, supra note 171. 
 177.  Id. 
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projects, regardless of source of financing.178  As OZ investment 
continues to flow into the District, “the city is tracking and reviewing 
proposals for discretionary development and map amendments in 
Opportunity Zones to ensure that proposed projects align with 
existing plans and provide benefits to the surrounding community.”179 
Mayor Bowser has been clear that one of the highest priorities for 
her second term in office is the development of more affordable 
housing in the District; the city government is working to use the OZ 
program to achieve that goal.  This past spring, Mayor Bowser 
announced a $24 million commitment to fund projects in D.C.’s OZs, 
which “support affordable housing, workforce development, and the 
growth of small businesses.”180  This coincided with an announcement 
earlier the same month, that the Mayor was proposing an additional 
tax on commercial property sales181 to increase the city’s affordable 
housing trust fund substantially; in May, the D.C. City Council 
enacted a modified version of that tax into law.182 
In addition to using tax revenue to incentivize affordable housing 
development in OZs, D.C. has another tool at its disposal: the large 
amount of publicly-owned land in the District, which the government 
can use as an incentive for investors.183  Essential to catalyzing any 
OZ deal is the concept of “de-risking” it for the OZFund contributing 
the capital — which looks different depending on whether the 
investment is a piece of real estate to be developed or a 
 
 178.  Id. 
 179. Greene et al., supra note 168. 
 180. Opportunity Zones in Washington, DC, DC.GOV, 
https://dmped.dc.gov/page/opportunity-zones-washington-dc (last visited Mar. 17, 
2020) [https://perma.cc/X7UP-EXVN]. 
 181. Jon Banister, Bowser Unveils New CRE Tax Plan to Build Affordable 
Housing, BISNOW (Mar. 19, 2019), 
https://www.bisnow.com/washington-dc/news/affordable-housing/bowser-aims-to-gro
w-affordable-housing-fund-with-tax-on-commercial-property-sales-98056 
[https://perma.cc/RJ2K-PACX]. 
 182. Alex Koma, D.C. Council Signs off on New Budget Full of Tax Changes, 
More Funding for Housing Programs, WASH. BUS. J. (May 28, 2019), 
https://www.bizjournals.com/washington/news/2019/05/28/d-c-council-signs-off-on-ne
w-budget-full-of-tax.html [https://perma.cc/3EDZ-NXK7]. 
 183. Greene et al., supra note 168. “The city is also contributing public land and 
financing in these areas, which can help ensure that new projects will provide job 
opportunities for local residents and businesses through DC’s first source hiring and 
small business contracting requirements.” Id. See also Cheryl Cort, Public Land 
Deals Give Hot Neighborhoods Affordable Housing, GREATER GREATER WASH. 
(June 4, 2012), 
https://ggwash.org/view/27915/public-land-deals-give-hot-neighborhoods-affordable-h
ousing [https://perma.cc/SCP8-RHMQ]. 
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business-seeking venture capital funding.184  While this tool is still in 
its early stages, the use of public land for OZ development holds 
tremendous promise: if the city already owns a piece of property and 
can contribute it to an OZ transaction, that both lowers the risk 
inherent in the deal (by removing the need to purchase the property 
in the first place) and gives the city enormous leverage in dictating 
what kind of project will be built.185 
Finally, the District has created a number of policy initiatives that 
fall into the “informal policymaking” category: it created a network of 
professionals (like lawyers and accountants) called the “OZ 
Community Corps” that has agreed to provide pro bono services to 
District residents, small businesses, and nonprofits seeking to start 
projects — or attract investment — in OZs.186  Also, in July 2019, it 
launched an “Opportunity Zone Marketplace,” a platform for 
investors to use to find OZ-eligible projects; projects on the 
marketplace site must meet one of the criteria established by the city 
for projects that are socially beneficial.187 
IV. ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION OF OPPORTUNITY ZONE 
PROGRAMS 
The case studies discussed in Part III represent a range of different 
policy responses to the OZ Program across a spectrum, from informal 
government policy to formal policymaking.188  The ultimate yardstick 
for judging the utility of any of these methods will be their effect: do 
they attract OZ investment?  And even more crucially, does that 
 
 184. See Telephone Interview with Stephanie Copeland, supra note 98. 
 185. For an analogous, though not OZ-related, project illustrating this principle, 
see Elena Knopp, As Bayfront Master Developer, Jersey City Can Call Shots, NJBIZ 
(July 9, 2018), 
https://njbiz.com/as-bayfront-master-developer-jersey-city-can-call-shots/ 
[https://perma.cc/4RK3-57DA]. 
 186. Become a Service Provider: OZ Community Corps, GOV’T D.C., 
https://ozmarketplace.dc.gov/pages/community-corps-service-providers 
[https://perma.cc/W28U-T8XW] (last visited Apr. 4, 2020). 
 187. Press Release, Office of the Deputy Mayor for Planning & Econ. Dev., Mayor 
Bowser Hosts Fifth Annual March Madness Featuring Senator Scott and 
Congresswoman Norton to Highlight Opportunities for All (Mar. 26, 2019), 
https://dmped.dc.gov/release/mayor-bowser-hosts-fifth-annual-march-madness-featur
ing-senator-scott-and-congresswoman [https://perma.cc/39DN-62LL]. 
 188. Of course, one possible response not considered here is to ban OZ investment 
entirely, or to place a moratorium on their use, which Boulder, CO adopted and then 
reversed. See Sam Lounsberry, Boulder Council Lifts Opportunity Zone 
Development Moratorium, DAILY CAMERA (Oct. 16, 2019), 
https://www.dailycamera.com/2019/10/16/boulder-council-lifts-opportunity-zone-deve
lopment-moratorium/ [https://perma.cc/KKQ6-B2AJ]. 
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investment catalyze the kind of economic development that lifts 
low-income communities out of poverty, or does it simply act as a tax 
giveaway for the rich on the investor side while simultaneously 
accelerating gentrification and displacement on the community side? 
It will be years before those questions are answered or are even 
answerable.  However, since the OZ program is now two years old, 
the IRS regulations have been finalized, and OZFunds have raised 
and deployed several billions of dollars in capital, we can draw some 
preliminary conclusions about state and local action.  Accordingly, 
this Part evaluates the policies articulated above and suggests a 
course of action for state and local governments, based on the 
findings in Part III and also on a set of tools traditionally in the local 
government toolkit. 
A. Evaluation 
In the spring of 2019, the trade publication Institutional Investor 
published an extremely well-sourced article titled, “Is Anyone 
Actually Investing in Opportunity Zone Funds?”  Its answer, in short, 
was “not really,” or at least, “not to the extent the investment 
community thought they would.”189  One challenge the article 
highlights is the extended lock-up period: it quoted one fund manager 
who said that OZs are “a longer-term investment that takes more 
consideration before pulling the trigger.”190 
But perhaps a more fundamental challenge to using OZs for impact 
is the uphill battle of changing “operating norms”: since capital tends 
to follow pre-set channels, the default position of investors looking at 
OZs is to do what they have always done — find the safest possible 
investment, whether or not it is going to improve outcomes for poor 
neighborhoods and their residents; if no safe investments are readily 
apparent, investors will stay away.191  And so a crucial role that state 
and local governments can play in the OZ space is to help solve this 
coordination problem: to help bureaucrats and investors speak the 
 
 189. See Alicia McElhaney, Is Anyone Actually Investing in Opportunity Zone 
Funds?, INSTITUTIONAL INV. (May 23, 2019), 
https://www.institutionalinvestor.com/article/b1fjptxryzv07y/Is-Anyone-Actually-Inve
sting-in-Opportunity-Zone-Funds [https://perma.cc/M4WJ-CBW4]. Though it is 
worth noting that there was a huge influx of capital to OZFunds in the closing weeks 
of 2019. See Michael Novogradac, Opportunity Zone Resource Center, 
NOVOGRADAC (Jan. 8, 2020), 
https://www.novoco.com/notes-from-novogradac/opportunity-funds-listing-shows-str
ong-increase-investment [https://perma.cc/5AD8-TLC8]. 
 190. McElhaney, supra note 189. 
 191. See Telephone Interview with Stephanie Copeland, supra note 98. 
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same language, to identify worthwhile investments by engaging with 
communities, and to stop unproductive investments.  Some OZFunds 
will seek out socially beneficial projects and invest in them on their 
own, motivated simply by a desire to create impact.192  But without 
strong participation from government, most funds likely will not. 
Knowing what we know now — that the scale of OZ investment is 
significant, though far short of initial predictions193 — a central 
challenge has emerged: state and local actors need to walk a fine line 
between attracting investment on the one hand while simultaneously 
setting up guardrails to direct capital toward worthwhile projects and 
discourage investment in projects that are either net-negative or 
which will push out longtime residents (especially residents from 
historically marginalized communities).  These goals are not 
diametrically opposed, but they are in tension with one another: 
advertise OZ-eligible investments too heavily (and layer on too much 
public money in incentives) and governments risk accelerating 
displacement and gentrification.  However, if state and local actors 
create too many guardrails — in a way that is perceived as 
anti-investment — they will scare away investors altogether and lose 
out on the opportunity to inject capital into places that need it badly. 
Overall, state and local governments should take three affirmative 
steps to attract and direct OZ funding for impact in order to walk the 
fine line described above. First, they should use informal 
policymaking power to identify and then advertise socially impactful 
projects.  Next, they should craft a package of incentives or capital 
unique to their local context, though with extensive strings attached.  
Finally, they should reserve the power to ward off damaging 
investments.  These three policy prescriptions are designed to help 
government officials — largely in the community economic 
development space — strike an appropriate balance. 
The first step that state and local governments should take is to 
create marketing materials and pitchbooks similar to the one the City 
of Louisville built with help from Bruce Katz and Accelerator for 
America.194  That process ought to begin by actively engaging 
community stakeholders in a conversation about where investment 
would be most impactful.  Cities like Washington, D.C. (or New York 
 
 192. See id. 
 193. As of summer 2020, when this Note went to press, the most recent data 
available from Novogradac showed that roughly $4.46 billion had been invested in 
OZFunds, far short of initial expectations. See Novogradac, Opportunity Funds 
Listing, supra note 22. 
 194. See supra Section III.C. 
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with its Community Board system) which already have a mechanism 
in place to “encourage and facilitate the participation of citizens 
within City government,” are at a natural advantage, though lacking 
such a system is by no means an insurmountable roadblock.195  Lining 
up projects for investors provides a starting point for a conversation 
about where investment can do the most good as well as generate the 
most return.  Governments should also pay very close attention to the 
Governance Project’s “Plug-and-Play” tool when it is released, since 
it can go a long way toward making deals more attractive.196 
Another trend which has emerged from the constellation of state 
and local OZ early adopters is that many of the most successful 
regions, which are generating investment and placing meaningful 
restrictions on it, have adopted a “carrot and stick” approach, under 
which they offer capital or an additional incentive in exchange for 
restrictions.  And so, the second step that state and local governments 
should take is to follow this lead. 
In doing so, they should seek to craft a package of incentives that is 
reflective of the local economic context.  For instance, there is a 
crucial distinction between the types of incentives that are appealing 
to funds that invest in real estate projects and funds that invest 
venture capital dollars at the seed or the growth stages — in other 
words, in operating businesses.  Much of the OZ coverage in the 
national press, particularly the most controversial coverage, has 
focused on real estate projects.  In reality, many of the OZ program’s 
creators, and its highest-profile advocates, now argue that operating 
businesses should be the real focus of investment moving forward 
since they can be more impactful and since the abuse potential may 
be lower.197 
For OZFunds investing in real estate, the package of tax incentives 
that many states have proposed — and some have enacted — might 
 
 195. Community Boards Explained, NYC.GOV, 
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[https://perma.cc/M4FV-S2S6] (last visited Apr. 4, 2020). 
 196. See Telephone Interview with Stephanie Copeland, supra note 98. 
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Zone Program, BISNOW (June 30, 2019), 
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Please remember that we’re all dealing with real estate, while the 
regulations were meant for businesses and jobs, jobs, jobs,” Friedman said. 
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stranded real estate in this country . . . . The corporations have to go to OZs, 
which they will because the advantages [for them] are unbelievable. 
Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
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be impactful.198  One tool which could help incentivize targeted real 
estate development in OZs is for states and municipalities to help 
lower the cost basis of development: first, by providing access to 
cheap debt, and also by de-risking the development cycle.199  
Washington, D.C.’s commitment to provide $24 million in funding for 
affordable housing in OZs is a great example of the former — more 
states and cities should follow its lead.  To de-risk development, state 
and local governments should also offer expedited zoning approval 
for OZ investments that are determined to offer meaningful 
community benefits.200 
However, expedited zoning approval, or additional tax incentives, 
are unlikely to be effective for OZFunds investing in operating 
businesses.  On those kinds of deals, operating businesses may 
present higher risks if they lack collateralized real estate assets.201  
The most impactful step that state and local governments can take to 
attract and direct these investment dollars is likely to offer catalytic 
first-loss capital.  Since venture capital as an asset class is risky, a 
priority for OZFund managers is to minimize or eliminate downside 
risk.202  States and municipalities who want to use OZs for impact can 
maximize their influence and also scale up investment dollars by 
providing this sort of protection for investors. 
Whether they offer incentives in the form of tax benefits, 
accelerated zoning approval, or catalytic first-loss capital, state and 
local governments should attach significant restrictions — in the form 
of legally binding covenants — that require community engagement, 
transparency, scale, and impact.  The Kresge Foundation’s work is a 
terrific model; the only logical criticism that can be leveled against it 
is that its scale is simply too small to keep pace with net-negative 
investment from OZFunds who are not concerned with social impact 
at all.  The philanthropic sector — and state and local governments — 
should invest more dollars in the sort of first-loss capital that Kresge 
allocated and which localities like Cuyahoga County then 
turbocharged with additional capital.  The good news is that many of 
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the brightest minds in the community economic development space203 
have already done the hard work of clarifying what kinds of 
additional restrictions on OZ investment would be impactful, and that 
those restrictions are being implemented around the country.  In 
other words, the investment and philanthropic communities have 
found an idea that works — catalytic first loss capital paired with 
robust restrictions; the next step is to expand that model before it is 
too late. 
Finally, state and local governments should enact policies to blunt 
the impact of damaging OZ investment.  Washington, D.C. is a 
terrific example of the ways localities that already have strong laws 
regulating development can enmesh OZs within that statutory 
framework.204  Regions without a similar framework to Washington, 
D.C.’s should enact one, and should aim to deploy the wide range of 
policy tools available to restrict or encourage development, up to and 
including enacting a short-term ban on the construction of 
self-storage facilities, or re-zone neighborhoods where developers 
have proposed multifamily condo construction.  Even if the overall 
impact of OZs ends up being significantly smaller than expected, 
governments can and should use local regulatory power to push 
capital toward social impact. 
CONCLUSION 
When asked what he thought of the French Revolution, Chinese 
Premier Zhou Enlai is reported to have said that it was “too early to 
say.”205  The same can certainly be said of the OZ program and of the 
policy moves that governments have engineered to respond to it. 
Some commentators have argued that state and local action to 
mold the OZ initiative is unwarranted.206  It does seem as though the 
program will be smaller in scope than originally envisioned.  But still, 
the threat of unchecked capital is very real, especially in rapidly 
developing and gentrifying communities.  And there is also a very real 
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possibility that, in the wake of the coronavirus pandemic and the 
recession that will almost certainly ensue,207 policymakers will 
consider enacting a variant of the OZ program as part of a package of 
long-term relief or might even simply expand the original program.  
Furthermore, there are reasons to believe that partnerships between 
government and OZFunds can create scale, impact, transparency, and 
community input.  More state and local governments should follow 
suit.  Or as Warren Buffett once observed, “Big opportunities come 
infrequently.  When it’s raining gold, reach for a bucket, not a 
thimble.”208 
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